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FOREWORD 
Within IIASA's Environment Program, one of the objectives of the 
Project on Decision Support Systems for Managing Large 
International River Basins is to improve the exploitation of 
increasingly cheap and powerful computer analyses in 
international river basin negotiations and management. For 
hardware, the focus is on personal computers, as they may be the 
only technology reliably available in some parts of the world. 
For software, the emphasis is on graphics and menu-driven 
routines that are easy to use and interpret. 
The computer work at IIASA is being done in connection with two 
case studies of international negotiations and joint management. 
One concerns the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros barrage and hydroelectric 
project on the Danube River. The other has been initiated in the 
context of the Zambezi Action Plan (ZACPLAN), signed by five of 
the eight Zambezi River Basin states in May 1987. One purpose is 
to assure that IIASA's software development is directly relevant 
and useful to specific issues and institutions in these two river 
basins. 
But good comparative analysis of alternative projects and 
management arrangements is only part of negotiating mutually 
beneficial international agreements. And often it is harder to 
generate promising creative alternatives to be considered, than 
it is to analyze them subsequently. This paper describes work in 
progress to develop a simple personal computer package to help 
with the task of generating creative alternatives tailored to 
specific problems of international river basin negotiations and 
joint management. 
R.E. Munn 
Leader 
Environment Program 
INTERNATIONAL RTVER RASTN NEGOTTATTONS: 
BUILDING A DATABASE OF 1LLUSTRATIVE SUCCESSES 
Alan McDonald* 
1. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
This working paper is for those who may someday want to 
hire an international water lawyer. The lawyer's expertise 
might be needed to design an international water agreement, or 
to help resolve an imminent or existing dispute. The relevant 
expertise that the lawyer brings to such tasks has many 
dimensions. This paper addresses a part of that expertise -- 
first, the lawyer's working acquaintance with a large catalogue 
of possibly analogous successful agreements, and, second, some 
rules of thumb for zeroing in quickly on the most promising 
entries in that catalogue. 
I do not aspire to render water lawyers obsolete, only 
to give those who hire them a headstart. This paper introduces 
a database I have begun building to put examples of successful 
agreements, and cooperative tactics, at the fingertips of those 
who do not have the benefit of extensjve personal involvement 
in the making of international water law. With the database, 
people in government ministries, international agencies, donor 
agencies, and private companies will be able to search 
efficiently through a large set of past agreements to find 
quickly those that have some useful similarities with their own 
situations. 
The database I have called ILLEX, for ILL,ustrative 
Examples of Negotiating Successes Relevant tolnternational 
- 
Rivers. 
ILLEX is being developed in cooperation with the Large 
International Rivers Project (LIR) of the International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). ILLEX 
complements other research within the LIR Project to develop 
computer software (called IRIS for Interactive RIver Simulation 
package) to evaluate alternative proposals for developing or 
managing a given international rjver basin. IRIS will be 
flexible enough to be used for different, and possibly 
conflicting, analyses for different parties, incorporating in 
each case the assumptions and forecasting models preferred by 
one of the parties. 
But for all its ability to evaluate proposals, IRIS will 
not generate new alternatives. And it is sometimes the 
inability to generate new, creative "candidate agreements" to 
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then be analyzed that stymies a negotiation, rather than 
insufficient analytic capabilities. 
Thus negotiations benefit from both creativity and good 
analytic competence among the parties. ILLEX is an effort to 
facilitate creativity. Its premise is that creative proposals 
often come from creative analogies, or from mixing and matching 
pieces from a series of creative analogies. The computer can 
help in that process, though in ILLEX the computer's power is 
harnessed in only a limited way. ILLEX is not an "expert 
system" aspiring to computer reasoning by analogy. The 
analogizing is done by people -- partly by me when building 
ILLEX, and partly by the user when running ILLEX. The power of 
the computer is used, first, to store a large number of 
examples and, second, to search quickly for relevant examples 
based on hints from the person using the database. 
Ultimately, the value of ILLEX can only be judged by 
those for whom it is intended in ministries, agencies, and 
companies. However, my anticipation is that at least two 
features of ILLEX will be particularly important in determining 
its ultimate success: how comprehensive it is, and how easily 
one can quickly find useful analogies through using it. ILLEX 
is still only in its early stages, so it does not yet pass the 
test of comprehensiveness. However, it is getting big enough 
that, before a lot more effort is committed, ILLEX should face 
initial tests of the ease and speed with which it can be used. 
The purpose of this working paper is therefore to jnrorm 
people with an interest in international river negotiations 
about ILLEX, to allow them to judge its initial progress, and 
to solicit their criticisms (or encouragement). 
The paper's organization is as follows. 
Section 2 explains, first, how entries for ILLEX were 
selected and what sort of information they include. Second, it 
explains how the entries are indexed, or "keyworded," so that 
someone can search through them quickly to find entries similar 
to his own situation. 
Section 3 then compares ILJ,EX with several. related 
databases of international conflicts and legal precedents. 
Section 4 presents a tutorial on searching ILLEX. 
Appendix 1 is a vocabulary of the keywords used in 
indexing all the entries. The vocabulary is very useful to 
have at hand when searching ILLEX. 
Appendix 2 presents the full text and keywords for all 
the entries currently in ILLEX. In including this "hard copy" 
version of the database, I should stress that ILLEX is designed 
to be used on a personal computer. It is the computer's power 
that is exploited to allow fast, complex searches. Thus, to 
evaluate ILLEX properly, one must work with the compuLer 
version, and I will explain in the next paragraph how you can 
get a copy. Nonetheless, Appendix 2 has been included here to 
provide enough information to interest more people in testing 
the computer version. 
To run the computer version of ILLEX you will need, 
first, the floppy diskette version of Appendix 2. This you can 
get by contacting me at: 
Alan McDonald 
American Academy of Arts and Sciences 
136 Irving Street 
Cambridge, MA 02138 
USA 
Telephone: 617-576-5019 
You also will need a copy of some commercial software called 
FYI 3000 Plus, which does the searches. If there is not too 
much demand, you can borrow a copy from me. Alternatively, you 
can order a copy for about $195 (minus whatever discounts you 
qualify for) from 
FYI, Inc. 
P.O. Box 26481 
Austin, TX 78755 
USA 
Telephone: 512-346-0133 
Finally, you will need an IRM-PC, or 100% compatible 
personal computer, with 128K random access memory and either 
two drives or a hard disk. 
2. HOW EXAMPLES AND KEYWORDS WERE CHOSEN 
Each example in ILLEX is short and illustrates just a 
single feature of a particular negotiation or agreement. The 
feature illustrated is one that lends j tself to i~seful 
analogizing according to the framework described below. Thus 
there is not a single entry summarizing all dimensions of, say, 
the Columbia River Treaty. Rather there are (in the case of 
the Columbia River Treaty) three entries, each illustrating 
just one feature of the treaty or the negotiations that led up 
to it. 
Each example begins with a title summarizing what the 
example illustrates. This is followed by one or two computer 
screens of text describing the example in more detail. Next 
comes a listing of published references upon which the example 
is based, and finally come the keywords. 
The examples are not taken exclusively from 
international river basin negotiations. Other cases are 
included when they might provide a useful analogy for at least 
one feature of a river negotiation. For example, negotiations 
on international air pollution may yield lessons useful to 
negotiations addressing water pollution. Resolving disputed 
boundaries on land or at sea may have much in common with 
resolving disputed river boundaries. And even the resolutions 
of purely domestic disputes can sometimes be suggestive for 
those dealing with international problems. 
Keywords 
At the end of each example in the database there are 
approximately ten to twenty "keywords," as they are referred to 
by ILLEX, though in many cases they are phrases, not single 
words. It is through specifying keywords that a user 
identifies features of his own negotiating situation, or of a 
hypothetical situation, for which he is looking for analogies. 
Therefore, to use ILLEX effectively, a user should have a sense 
of both the range of keywords used, and the concepts of 
negotiation theory that were the basis for assigning keywords 
to each example. The full list of keywords is referred to by 
ILLEX as its "vocabulary" and is given in Appendix 1. The 
remainder of this section introduces most of the keywords and 
explains the principles that have been used in keywording each 
example. 
Integrative Bargaining vs. Distributive Bargaining: the tension 
between making the pie bigger and dividing it up 
One stereotype that is popularly associated with the 
word negotiation is that of a village market where a buyer and 
a seller haggle about the price of some item. The higher the 
price they settle on, the more money ends up in the seller's 
pocket; the lower the price they agree to, the more money stays 
in the buyer's pocket. This is straightforward distributive 
bargaining -- what one gets the other gives up. 
But almost all negotiations have another dimension. By 
combining resources, or by well designed trade-offs, two 
parties can create additional value above and beyond what each 
brought to the negotiation. In fact most international river 
projects are clearly dominated by value creation. Joint 
hydroelectric projects, for example, are undertaken precisely 
because they provide more cheap power than the sum of the 
unilateral alternatives available to the parties involved. 
Efforts to jointly create new value, to "make the pie bigger," 
are labeled "integrative bargaining" to distinguish them from 
the distributive dimension of all negotiations. 
All the illustrative examples in ILLEX are examples of 
integrative bargaining. It is therefore important to emphasize 
that integrative bargaining is only a part of any negotiation, 
and that there is always a tension between integrative 
bargaining and distributive bargaining. As stated by Weeks, 
"although both creating [integrative] and claiming 
[distributive] processes are going on simultaneously in nearly 
every negotiation, the tactics used for creating and for 
claiming value differ dramatically. Thus the negotiator is 
constantly torn between the good communication, openness, 
trust, creativity, and joint problem-solving of integrative 
tactics, and the hiding of information, making of commitments, 
exaggeration of the cost of concessions, distortion of 
information, lying, and threatening of distributive tactics" 
(Weeks, 1986). This dynamic is discussed at length by Raiffa 
(1982) and by Lax and Sebenius (1986), and the interested 
reader is referred to these books for a proper treatment of the 
subject. For the purposes of this paper, I simply want to 
caution that in its focus on integrative bargaining I L L E X  
addresses only part of the whole story. 
Thus the first theoretical categorization upon which the 
selection of illustrative examples is based is the distinction 
between examples of integrative bargaining and examples of 
distributive bargaining. ILLEX includes only examples of 
integrative bargaining. 
Cooperative Tactics 
Next, the examples of integrative bargaining are 
considered in two subcategories, "cooperative tactics" and 
"creative compromises," which correspond precisely to two 
keywords in ILLEXts vocabulary, COOPERATIVE TACTICS and 
CREATIVE COMPROMISES. (Keywords will appear in this paper jn 
upper case because that is the way they appear in ILLEX.) Thus 
a user can, if he wishes, restrict ILLEX's search for analogies 
to just one or the other of these categories by requesting only 
the examples with the appropriate keyword. The details of 
typing in such a request are described in Section 4. 
Cooperative tactics are features that the parties may 
want to introduce into the process of the negotiation itself. 
More particularly, they are features that have often enhanced 
integrative bargaining within negotiations and thus facilitated 
resolution. In the vocabulary there are seven keywords 
referring to cooperative tactics. They are introduced here in 
alphabetical order. 
INCREMENTAL AGREEMENTS: Rather than try to resolve all 
contentious issues simultaneously and once and for all, it is 
often productive to try to get an initial agreement, even if 
only in an informal way, on a subset of issues. Sometimes this 
is possible because there are some "easy" issues that are not 
hard to resolve as long as they are separated from other more 
difficult issues. Sometimes an initial agreement on principles 
is possible as long as it avoids contentious specifics of how 
the principles are to be implemented. I L L E X  incl udes exampl es 
of both situations. 
There are several possible explanations for why 
incremental agreements can move a stalled negotiation toward 
success. For example, they create a small tradition of trust 
and agreement; they increase the costs of subsequently breaking 
off negotiations; and in the case of incremental agreements on 
principles they shift subsequent discussions toward joint 
problem solving based on shared principles, and away from 
stubborn defenses of conflicting positions (Fisher and Ury, 
1981). 
INTERVENOR WITH RESOURCES AND INTERESTS: When partjes 
to a negotiation are stalled, it is common to bring in a third 
party who is not allied with any of the principals to help. 
For example, negotiators involved in labor-management disputes 
often turn to mediators, arguing children appeal to parents, 
and countries can request United Nations involvement. 
Sometimes the third party joins in uninvited. In international 
negotiations an intervenor almost always has an interest in the 
outcome, even if it is only the widely shared interest in peace 
that is a common basis for UN interventions. And often an 
international intervenor brings important resources. He may be 
able to increase the size of the pie the disputants are trying 
to divide; he may have information or the analytic capability 
for resolving particularly problematic points; he may be able 
to guarantee a settlement, due to his military or financial 
strength, that would otherwise be too risky for the disputants; 
or he may be able to increase the cost of failure confronting 
one or more of the disputants. 
INTERVENTION: This keyword simply defines a broader 
category than that immediately above. It therefore also 
includes cases where the intervenor plays a neutral role and 
brings no power to the negotiation other than the power of 
persuasion. 
JOINT ANALYSIS: Joint analysis of alternatives for 
developing or managing an international river basjn has several 
advantages. It is cheaper than each party doing its own 
analysis, it steers the negotiatjon toward joint problem 
solving and away from positional bargaining, and it allows 
problematic issues to be dealt with as soon as they arise 
rather than after differences have become deeply entrenched. 
SEPARATING ISSUES: Consider the example of two riparian 
countries arguing over the location of the international 
boundary in the river that separates them. Agreement may be 
impossible as long as it is assumed that the location of the 
boundary will automatically determine, for example, navigation 
rights, fishing rights, aircraft overflight rights, and the 
ownership of islands. If these issues are separated, however, 
fishing issues can be resolved in a way that truly responds to 
the parties' concerns about fishing, while navigation issues 
may be resolved in an entirely different way that is 
nonetheless equally responsive to the parties' concerns about 
navigation. The added flexibility can make the difference 
between a settlement and an impasse. 
SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT: In instances where there is an 
intervenor, he may choose to use a single negotiating text 
(SNT) as a technique to move the negotiators toward agreement 
(Fisher and Ury, 1981; Raiffa, 1982). Rather than allowing 
competing proposals and counter-proposals to be presented, 
there is only one proposal on the table at any time, that of 
the intervenor. Criticism and analysis is focussed on the 
shortcomings of this single negotiating text, until the 
intervenor agrees that enough additional insights have emerged 
to justify his preparation of a revised version. This is a new 
complete package incorporating the various criticisms of the 
previous version in a way the intervenor judges to be a 
collective improvement. The process continues until one of the 
revisions is unanimously accepted. 
THIRD-PARTY ANALYSIS: Negotiating parties might have 
neither the resources, the expertise, nor the degree of 
cooperation necessary to undertake joint analysis as described 
above. In such a situation they can nonetheless sometimes 
benefit by turning to analysis done by a third party, whether 
carried out at their specific request or entirely 
independently. 
Issues and Actors 
Examples are also keyworded to indicate the issues 
rising in the cases they describe, and to indicate the parties 
nvolved. Among the "issues" keywords in the vocabulary in 
Appendix 1 are BOUNDARIES, COMPENSATION, FISHING, FLOOD 
CONTROL, FLOW REGULATION, HYDROELECTRICITY, IRRIGATION, LAND 
USE, MINING, NAVIGATION, OIL RESOURCES, POLLUTION, ROYALTIES, 
SITING, SOVEREIGNTY, WATER ALLOCATION, WATER QUALITY, and WATER 
STORAGE. 
The vocabulary also includes 72 countries, from ALGERIA 
to ZIMBABWE, and 17 international organizations, from the 
BINATIONAL ENTITY FOR YACYRETA to the WORLD BANK. Where 
relevant, the name of the river or other body of water which is 
the subject of the example is included as a keyword. Also 
included where relevant is the common name of the agreement the 
example describes, e.g., the LAW OF THE SEA or the OWENS FALLS 
DAM AGREEMENT. 
Creative Compromises 
Where the keyword COOPERATIVE TACTICS referred to 
features of negotiation processes, the keyword CREATIVE 
COMPROMISES refers to features of negotiating outcomes, of the 
agreements that finally emprge. The creative comprnmises 
illustrated in ILLEX fall into three categories, each wiCh its 
own keyword: TRADEOFFS, CONTINGENT AGREEMENTS, and FAIR 
DIVISION. The three categories, and additional keywords 
related to FAIR DIVISION, are described below. 
Negotiating failures are often due to important 
irreconcilable differences between parties. But negotiating 
successes are often also due to important differences between 
parties. In particular, differences in people's tastes and 
preferences provide the raw material for fashioning creative 
trades that leave all parties better off. If a person who 
prefers apples to oranges, and has equal amounts of both, meets 
someone with just as many apples and oranges, but with a 
preference for the oranges over the apples, it is easy to see 
the potential for a trade that will make both happier. Because 
there will always be a distributive dimension to the 
negotiation, there is no guarantee that the potential will be 
realized, but it is the difference in preferences that makes a 
trade possible at all. Included in ILLEX, therefore, are 
examples where differences in how strong1.y the parties felt 
about e.g. sovereignty, fishing rights, navigation rights, or 
the right to underwater resources were the basis for an 
eventual package of tradeoffs considered desirable by all. 
Such examples all include among their set of keywords, the 
keyword TRADEOFFS. 
While mutual-ly beneficial tradeoffs are based on 
differences in tastes or preferences, "contingent agreements" 
are based on differences in expectations about how various 
alternatives will work out if actually adopted. 
Imagine a hypothetical example of two countries 
negotiating arrangements for future hydroelectricity sales from 
a joint hydropower project. They have agreed to allocate half 
of the electricity produced to each country, but both recognize 
that Country X will not be able to use all its allocation 
internally, while Country Y's electricity demand will outstrip 
its allocation. The standard solution is that X agrees to sell 
its surplus to Y. X gets an assured market, and Y gets an 
assured supply. But imagine the following disagreement over 
what the price should be. XI the prospective seller, argues 
that the price of alternative sources of electricity for Y will 
be high in the future. Therefore, the hydroelectricity price 
should be set relatively high in recognition of the expected 
high price of its competitors. However Y, the prospective 
buyer, contends that X has badly over-estimated the future 
price of alternative electricity. Y accepts some linkage 
between the hydroelectricity price and the expected price of 
alternatives, but given Y's lower estimate of the future price 
of alternatives, Y argues that such linkage justifies a 
relatively low price for hydroelectricity. 
The difference between X's and Y's expectations can be 
the basis of a contingent agreement, where they agree that the 
hydroelectricity price will be adjusted in the future as the 
price of alternatives changes. Because this agreement means a 
high hydroelectricity price if the price of alternatives is 
high, which is what X predicts, X should find it attractive. 
And because it means a low hydroelectricity price if the price 
of alternatives is low, which is what Y predicts, Y should find 
it attractive. Thus, they could settle on such a contingent 
agreement without ever having to resolve the difference in 
their predictions. 
There are many pitfalls to negotiating contingent 
agreements however. Lax and Sebenius (1986) discuss these in 
depth, but a few examples are in order here. I f  future burdens 
and advantages are to be tied to a given indicator of how the 
future "turns out," that indicator must be relatively 
unambiguous and beyond manipulation by either party. Otherwise 
the contingent agreement will have only postponed a dispute, 
not resolved it. In the above hypothetical case, the indicator 
of alternative electricity prices might be explicitly derived 
from the internationally quoted price of crude oil as an 
indicator of fossil fuel prices. 
A second problem is the "morning after" problem. The 
following hypothetical illustration is from Lax and Sebenius 
(1986). 
"Suppose ... that a third party has induced the warring 
factions in a divided country to agree to a cease fire and 
to hold an election. Suppose that this agreement were 
possible primarily because each side had an over-optimisitc 
estimate of its chances to win. Once the election [was] 
held, high expected utility would be replaced by a declared 
winner and an army of angry losers. Was thought given, for 
example, to how after the election a dominant coalition 
might form? Otherwise, the losers may find that abiding by 
the agreement and being ruled by the winners is worse for 
them than their alternative to continued agreement, which 
is to start fighting again . . .  
"[For a contingent agreement to] be effective, the costs 
incurred for not complying must exceed the benefjt of 
reneging; otherwise the bargainer will happily renege." 
After "tradeoffs" and "contingent agreements" the third 
category of creative compromises is "fair division." These are 
cases where it proved more desirable to agree a priori to a 
rule or procedure for fairly dividing benefits, or allocating 
costs, than to attempt to negotiate competitive1.y a specific 
division. There is no one set of fair division rules or 
procedures that is theoretically or practically perfect. There 
are instead a number of options. 
Most of the fair division rules that appear in one or 
another of ILLEX's examples are clear from their keywords: 
e.g., EQUAL BENEFITS, EQUAL BURDENS, EQUAL COSTS, EQUAL 
OPPORTUNITIES, PROPORTIONAL BENEFITS, PROPORTIONAL BURDENS, and 
PROPORTIONAL COSTS. Others are less straightforward, such as 
the method of SEPARABLE COSTS-REMAINING BENEFITS (SCHB). The 
SCRB method allocates to each party the marginal cost of his 
inclusion in a project plus a share of the non-separable costs 
that is proportional to the benefits he receives by jojning the 
joint project instead of going it alone. 
Currently ILLEX contains only one example of a fair 
division procedure, as distinguished from a fair divisjon rule. 
The procedure's keyword is DIVIDE-AND-CHOOSE. The most 
familiar illustration is its application to the problem of 
fairly dividing a piece of cake between two young claimants. 
If an adult cuts the cake, there is the danger that whichever 
child does not get to choose first between the two pieces will 
protest that he was left with a smaller piece. With the 
divide-and-choose procedure, however, one child cuts the piece 
of cake into two, and the other gets first choice between the 
two pieces. If the cutter is left with a smaller piece, he has 
only himself to blame. So he has a strong incentive to dividc 
the cake evenly. This procedure, in a less pedestrian version, 
was incorporated in the Law of the Sea Convention, an 
application included in ILLEX. 
Definitions and Publications 
In addition to examples of complete and partial 
negotiating successes ILLEX contains two other types of 
entries. They have not been mentioned until now so as not to 
divert attention from the central aspect of the database, the 
examples. And they are included only to make it easier to make 
use of the information in the examples. 
First, ILLEX includes definitions of some of the 
keywords found in the vocabulary, such as FAlR DIVISION, 
CONTINGENT AGREEMENTS, and RISK AVERSION, to help users not 
familiar with the way these terms are used in ILLEX. The set 
of keywords for each such entry includes the keyword 
DEFINITIONS, as well as the keyword for the specific term being 
defined. 
Second, ILLEX contains a separate, short entry for each 
book or journal article referenced in one or more of the 
examples. There are a few references, such as UN documents, 
that are neither books nor journal articles, and ILLEX does not 
yet include separate entries for these publications. The 
entries for books and journal articles all include the keyword 
PUBLICATIONS. They are also keyworded according to the 
publication's author. Beyond that, however, they are not 
extensively keyworded, and they do not include abstracts. 
Additional effort could be devoted to these tasks if there is a 
demand for ILLEX to meet an unmet need for a compu!erized 
annotated bibliography. For the moment, however, effort is 
focussed on building up the examples in ILLEX. 
Finally, while entries containing definitions and 
publications include the keywords DEFLNITIONS and PUBLICATIONS 
respectively, the entries with examples include, not 
surprisingly, the keyword EXAMPLES. 
3. COMPARISONS WITH OTHER DATABASES 
Historical Events Research in Political Science 
Since the late 1960s there have been several research 
efforts to assemble on computers summaries of international 
disputes and then code (in effect, keyword) each dispute 
according to who was involved, who intervened, any military 
action that occurred, and so forth. In some cases, the purpose 
has been, at least partly, quite close to that of ILLEX, i.e., 
to provide quickly examples of successful negotiations in 
situations similar to those of whomever is using the database 
(e.g., Bloomfield, 1987). In other cases, the purpose has been 
to provide data for statistically analyzing hypotheses about 
why some international conflicts escalate and how others are 
resolved (e.g., Butterworth, 1976). A summary of the main 
research efforts is provided by Sherman (1987a). 
Unfortunately the databases that have been compiled are 
not especially helpful when building ILLEX. First, most of 
their events are included because they involve hostilities. 
Thus successful negotiations that avoided threatened and actual 
hostilities are poorly represented, and it is these success 
stories that are desirable for ILLEX, not the failed 
negotiations that led to shooting. Second, even one of the 
largest of these databases, SHERFACS with approximately 1700 
total entries (Sherman, 1987b1, includes very few river 
disputes. (Perhaps this is a happy indicator that river 
conflicts lead to hostilities relatively rarely.) Third, the 
codings used by the political scientists cannot be directly 
converted to the framework of keywords described above. While 
some of the databases involve hundreds of coded variables for 
each entry, they either provide detail not of interest for 
ILLEX (levels of riots, border skirmishes, terrorism, strikes, 
repression, plots, major military confrontations, etc.) or too 
little detail on other issues; a party's interests, for 
example, might be coded simply as primarily economic, 
political, strategic, humanitarian, unknown, or irrelevant. In 
fact, in the databases examined so far, there is no code that 
indicates if an entry concerns rivers or other water bodies. 
Often the title of an entry gives a clue, but unlike the codes, 
titles cannot be scanned by the computer. To find entries that 
might be appropriate for ILLEX, it is therefore necessary to 
scan manually lists of entry titles or the actual narrative 
text within entries. 
Nonetheless, these databases do contain some entries 
that are very appropriate for ILLEX, though it is necessary to 
rewrite both the event summary and the coding/keywording. As 
can be seen from Appendix 2, a number of ILLEX examples 
reference Butterworth (1976), and there will undoubtedly be 
further references to the accomplishments of historical events 
research as ILLEX grows. 
Leqal Precedent: Lexis and WESTLAW 
Mead Data Central maintains extensive databases marketed 
commercially as the "Lexis/Nexis Information Services." These 
include, among other things, the full text of newspapers, 
magazines, corporate annual reports, the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service Code, tax handbooks, corporate filings with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission, all U.S. patents since 
1975, the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, U.K. statutes and 
statutory instruments, French laws and regulations, the U.S. 
Federal Register, major university law reviews, and over three 
million legal cases and other legal documents -- including 
American, English, and French case law, cases of the European 
Court of Justice, and decisions of the Commission of the 
European Communities. All the legal databases are available to 
subscribers to Lexis. The databases are continuously updated, 
and new legal decisions are added sometimes as soon as 48 hours 
after being handed down. 
The Lexis databases are not easy to search for 
suggestive analogies relevant to river basin disputes, though 
presumedly Lexis or a comparable source would have to be 
reviewed by water lawyers working on the final stages of a 
contract, a treaty, or litigation. What makes Lexis difficult 
is that a user must search the full text of the entries in a 
database. Lexis contributes no keywords, abstracts, or 
summaries, just the straight text whether it is a legal 
decision, a tax regulation, or a patent. One advantage of this 
approach is that a lot of new information can be added quickly; 
there is no need to wait for someone to keyword or abstract 
each new entry. The disadvantage is that judges, journalists, 
and administrators, in writing their opinions, newspaper 
articles, and regulations, do not necessarily use the terms of 
negotiation analysis in ways that lend themselves to computer 
searches. For example, imagine a judicial opinion that 
requires a polluter to post a bond which he will forfeit if he 
fails to meet a certain target clean-up date. Such a judgement 
is comparable to a contingent agreement, but there is no 
guarantee that the word "contingent," or even a plausible 
synonym, will necessarily appear in the judge's opinion. 
There is a second set of commercial databases designed 
principally for lawyers, WESTLAW, which is produced by West 
Pub1 ishj ng Company. WESTLAW provi des more than j l ~ s C  the texts 
of legal decisions. It includes headnotes and synopses written 
by its own editors, and it classifies cases by topics as well 
as by courts and judges. These added features make searches 
easier on WESTLAW than on Lexis, though they mean added time in 
getting a new case added to the WESTLAW databases. 
Even with its synopses and headnotes however, WESTLAW is 
not easy to search for successful river basin negotiations. 
First, neither it nor Lexis includes the real success stories, 
those agreements settled out of court or, better yet, without 
ever having contemplated litigation at all. Second, judicial 
opinions and administrative rulings are more often judgements 
in favor of one party or another's position, not examples of 
creative integrative bargaining. Third, even where an opinion 
or a ruling does exemplify principles of integrative 
bargaining, it is not presented as such in the text in WESTLAW 
or Lexis. 
The conclusion is that while WESTLAW and Lexis, like 
SHERFACS and CASCON, may provide raw material that can be 
productively mined in building ILLEX, they do not provide 
directly an easy way to zero in on past successes that provide 
helpful analogies for current international river basin 
negotiations. They do not make ILLEX redundant. 
4. SEARCHING THE DATABASE: A TUTORIAL 
This section presents complete instructions for going 
step-by-step through a simple sample computer search of T J , J ~ , E X .  
It is not intended to replace the FYI 3000 Plus users manual as 
a guide to the searching software. But it helps give an 
immediate sense of what ILLEX can provide when used on the 
computer. And it should be enough so that readers so inclined 
can forge ahead, prior to reading any manuals, with other 
searches beyond the sample given here. 
Throughout the tutorial there will be reproductions of 
what the person using ILLEX should see on the computer screen 
at each stage of the search. These reproductions of what is on 
the screen will be set off from the rest of the text with 
----------- double dashed lines; i.e., "----------- . " These reproduct ions 
of screen displays are provided solely so that you can check at 
any point to make sure things are going the way they should. 
It is not necessary even to read them as you go along, and some 
readers may find it easiest to go through this section a first 
time just following my tutorial instructions about which keys 
to hit, while barely taking in what is on the screen. 
To the extent that you do read some of what shows on the 
screen, please do not let yourself get distracted by any 
puzzling information, options, and instructions. If something 
appears that is neither straightforward nor explained in my 
instructions, then it is not necessary for getting through the 
tutorial. Ignore it. There will be plenty of time I n  explnrs 
later, with or without the FYI 3000 Flus users manual, more 
complex features of FYI 3000 Plus and ILLEX. The purpose of 
this section is simply to plod step-by-step through a sample 
search that is very basic. 
One bit of additional advice for those who are using a 
computer for the first time. When you strike a key, release it 
promptly. If you hold the key down, the computer will think 
you meant to hit it twice, or three times, or more, depending 
on how long you hold it down. 
My text reproductions of what appear on the screen are 
not perfect. For example, sometimes FYI 3000 Plus presents 
something on the screen in "reverse video," i.e., dark letters 
on a light background instead of light letters on a dark 
background. Since I haventt such fancy graphics here, text 
that appears in reverse video on the screen will be underlined 
in this section. Another convention I have used is that things 
that are to be typed by the person using ILLEX are enclosed in 
curly brackets, " {  1." You should type exactly what is inside 
the curly brackets, but not the brackets themselves. 
This tutorial is based on a system with two floppy disk 
drives. 
Boot your system so that the "A>" prompt appears. (If 
you don't understand this sentence, I think the easiest 
solution is to find someone who does. Alternatively, the 
manuals with your computer should explain how to boot your 
system.) Insert the diskette that says "FYI 3000 Pl-us" into 
drive A and type (fyi3000p1, and hit a carriage return. The 
screen will shortly appear as follows. 
FYI 3000 Plus (tm) 
Bringing power to your information 
Copyright (C) 1986 FYI, Inc. 
Unauthorized copying violates Federal law. 
~ 3 . 1 5  FY+OIB7-10115L 
START-UP MENU I 
F1 - Access existing filing systems 
F5 - Create new filing systems 
<Esc> - Exit from program 
Press F1, F5, or <Esc> > 
I 
.............................................................. 
.............................................................. 
The "Fl" stands for the function key #l. Therefore, 
just hit the function key #1 (hereafter referred to as Fl). 
You don't have to hit a carriage return. The screen will then 
look like this. 
Select from existing filing systems 
on > A:\ 
NO FILING SYSTEMS HERE 
i 
Type the number of filing system you want, and press ENTER. 1 
Or, type a new drive:\path, then press ENTER. I 
Or, press <Esc> to go back to START-UP MENU. 
I I 
Insert into drive B the diskette labeled "ILLEX DJSK NO. 
1," type {b:\) and a carriage return. Now the screen will look 
a little more encouraging. 
Select from existing filing systems 
on > B:\ 
1 ILLEX 
Type the number of filing system you want, and press ENTER. 1 
Or, type a new drive:\path, then press ENTER. 
Or, press <Esc> to go back to START-UP MENU. I 
> 
I 
I 
I 
.............................................................. 
.............................................................. 
Now type 11) and a carriage return. You will see: 
Filing system title: ILLEX 
Last modified: October 5, 1988 
Comment: Revision 0.04 
Entries defined by: Start and end markers 
Number of entries: 94 
Type of key words: Separate keywords 
Number of key words: 363 
Total number of key words 
in entire filing system: 1432 
F1 - Search filing system 
F2 - Display vocabulary 
F3 - Add entries 
F4 - Re-index this filing system 
F5 - Select another filing system 
i MAIN MENU 
<Esc> - Go back to start-up menu i 
i 
Press F1, F2, F3, F4, F5, or <Esc> > 1 
I 
At this stage, it is worth pointing out that you can 
almost always get out of any trouble within ILLEX by hitting 
the escape key, <Esc>, one, twice, or however many times you 
need to get back to a menu screen you recognize, and then start 
fresh from there. If you hit <Esc> enough times, you will 
eventually get back to the "A>" prompt of the operating system. 
To continue on from the above screen, hit F1. We want 
to do a sample search of ILLEX's examples. You will get the 
following. 
I 
For 'automatic' searching, just type a search word and press1 
ENTER. I 
For ' full-control' Boolean, type several left parentheses 
I ( ( ( '  then start building your search request. I 
For truncation in either search mode, type the first letters1 
of the word, followed by * .  I 
I I \  must precede search operators. <ESC> to quit. 1 
I 
Here is where we start to tell ILLEX what sorts of 
entries we want to see. We do this by typing one or more 
keywords. If we want to see all of ILLEX's examples, we would 
need to give it only the keyword EXAMPLES. But if we want to 
be more specific and see only those examples dealing with 
navigation, we would need to instruct ILLEX to show us any 
entries whose set of keywords includes both EXAMPLES - and 
NAVIGATION. For the purposes of this tutorial, suppose we 
would like to see examples involving tradeoffs where one of the 
relevant issues is sovereignty. This means we are looking for 
entries in ILLEX that have the three keywords, EXAMPLES and 
TRADEOFFS and SOVEREIGNTY. 
Begin by typing {EXAMPLES) and a carriage return. If 
you make a mistake, use the backspace key. Or you can always 
hit the escape key, which will take you back to the screen in 
the middle of page 16, and start with the search again. You 
may type the keyword in upper or lower case letters. After 
your carriage return the screen will be as follows. 
.............................................................. 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
I ( (EXAMPLES 1 
i 
l 
and > 1 
I 
.............................................................. 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
At this point type the next keyword {TRADEOFFS) and a 
carriage return. The screen will appear as follows. 
Now it is time to type the third keyword. At this 
stage, however, in order to demonstrate a nice feature of FYI 
3000 Plus, I suggest that you make a spelling mistake, say, 
{SOVREIGNITY). Then hit the carriage return. Since 
SOVREIGNITY is not in ILLEX's vocabulary, the screen will 
appear as follows. 
1 SOVREIGNITY not recognized 
these are close 
SOLE, M.E. 
SOUNDPROOFING 
SOUTH AFRICA 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE 
SOVEREIGNTY 
SOVIET UNION 
SPAIN 
STEIN, JANICE GROSS 
STEINHAUS PROCEDURE 
STREET REPAIRS 
If you now type it correctly, {SOVEREIGNTY), and hit a 
carriage return, you will get the following. 
I ( (EXAMPLE~ \AND TRADEoFFs \AND SOVEREIGNTY I 
Since we have no other keywords to add to this search, 
just hit a carriage return. You will get the following. (For 
those of you who think the screen below is identical to the one 
above, look again. In the screen below there is a parenthesis 
after SOVEREIGNTY, and the "and" on the reverse video line has 
changed to "or." Why the computer does this is indeed 
significant, but not for this tutorial. It is explained in the 
FYI 3000 Plus users manual.) 
Although the software is giving us the chance to make a 
more complex search, we are not interested (for the purposes of 
this tutorial); again hit a carriage return. There will be a 
brief message on the screen saying "SEARCHING," and then you 
will see: 
.............................................................. 
.............................................................. 
I SEARCH RESULTS MENU I 
5 entries were found that match your search request: 
I ---------- Current output Choices ---------- I 
Output destination is: ON SCREEN WITH OPTIONAL OUTPUT TO 
PRINTER 
Output content is: WHOLE ENTRY, INCLUDING MARKERS AND KEY 
WORDS 
Search request included with output - YES 
Disk and file names included with output - YES 
Retrieval Order - FIRST IN - FIRST OUT 
Press ENTER to proceed with output, I 
IF1 - Choose other output options (printer, disk file, 
content) 
F2 - Save search criteria on disk 
. F6 - Do another search (RESULTS OF CURRENT SEARCH WILL BE 
LOST) 1 
<Esc> - Return to Main Menu (RESULTS OF CURRENT SEARCH WILL 1 
BE LOST) 1 
Press ENTER, F1, F2, F6, or <Esc> > 
I 
I 
The second line on the above screen is important. It 
tells us that out of the 94 entries is ILLEX, the software 
found five that fit the search request, i.e., that, whatever 
their other characteristics, have all three keywords EXAMPLES, 
TRADEOFFS, and SOVEREIGNTY. 
Rather than simply hitting a carriage return ("pressing 
ENTER") to see the five examples in ILLEX that fit the search 
request, I suggest first instructing the machine to show us 
just summary titles of the five examples until we specifically 
ask it for the complete entries. To do this hit F1 to tell the 
machine we want to "choose other output options." The 
following menu will appear. 
OUTPUT OPTIONS MENU 
F1 - Output to (screen, printer or disk) 
now: ON SCREEN WITH OPTIONAL OUTPUT TO PRINTER 
F2 - Output content 
now: WHOLE ENTRY, INCLUDING MARKERS AND KEY WORDS 
F3 - Search request included with output . . . . .  now: YES 
F4 - Disk and file names included with output ..now: YES 
F5 - Retrieval Order: FIRST IN - FIRST OUT 
ENTER - Continue with output 
Press ENTER, ~ 1 ,  ~ 2 ,  ~ 3 ,  ~ 4 ,  or FS > i 
I 
.............................................................. 
.............................................................. 
The two lines that say 
"F2 - Output content 
now: WHOLE ENTRY, INCLUDING MARKERS AND KEY WORDS" 
mean, first, that if we proceed to look at the five entries 
resulting from our search, we will be shown each entry in its 
entirety. Second, these lines tell us that if we want to see 
something less in the way of "Output content," the first thing 
to do is hit F2. 
When you hit F2, a menu will appear at the bottom of the 
screen, so the whole screen will look like this. 
.............................................................. 
.............................................................. 
OUTPUT OPTIONS MENU 
I 
I 
I 
F1 - Output to (screen, printer or disk) 
now: ON SCREEN WITH OPTIONAL OUTPUT TO PRINTER 
F2 - Output content 
now: WHOLE ENTRY, INCLUDING MARKERS AND KEY WORDS 
F3 - Search request included with output . . . . .  now: YES 
F4 - Disk and file names included with output ..now: YES 
F5 - Retrieval Order: FIRST IN - FIRST OUT 
ENTER - Continue with output 
CHOOSE OUTPUT CONTENT 
F1 - Whole entry, including markers and key words 
F2 - Entry without markers or key words 
F3 - Short form (between *C and first * )  
Press F1, F2, or F3 > I 
I 
We want the short form, so hit F3. Don't worry about 
the meaning of the phrase in parentheses, though if you look at 
Appendix 2, it should be fairly apparent what's going to 
happen. The machine makes the change on the Output Options 
Menu, which now looks like this. 
OUTPUT OPTIONS MENU 
F1 - Output to (screen, printer or disk) 
now: ON SCREEN WITH OPTIONAL OUTPUT TO PRINTER 
F2 - Output content 
now: SHORT FORM (BETWEEN *C AND FIRST * )  
F3 - Search request included with output . . . . .  now: YES 
F4 - Disk and file names included with output ..now: YES 
F5 - Retrieval Order: FIRST IN - FIRST OUT 
ENTER - Continue with output 
Press ENTER, ~ 1 ,  ~ 2 ,  ~ 3 ,  ~ 4 ,  or ~5 > i 
I 
Now that we've made that change, let's "Continue with 
output" by hitting ENTER (or carriage return). This takes us 
back to the Search Results Menu with our change noted (see the 
line that begins "Output content is"). 
SEARCH RESULTS MENU 
5 entries were found that match your search request: i 
I ---------- Current Output Choices ---------- I 
Output destination is: ON SCREEN WITH OPTIONAL OUTPUT TO 
PRINTER 
Output content is: SHORT FORM (BETWEEN *C AND FIRST * )  
Search request included with output - YES 
Disk and file names included with output - YES 
Retrieval Order - FIRST IN - FIRST OUT 
Press ENTER to proceed with output, i 
I F1 - Choose other output options (printer, disk file, 
content) 
F2 - Save search criteria on disk 
1 ~ 6  - DO another search (RESULTS OF CURRENT SEARCH WILL BE 1 
LOST) 1 
<Esc> - Return to Main Menu (RESULTS OF CURRENT SEARCH WILL I 
BE LOST) I 
l~ress ENTER, F1, F2, F6, or <Esc> > 
I 
I 
Again we are told to press ENTER to proceed with output, 
so hit another carriage return. This will bring up the 
following. 
I 
Please insert ILLEX DISK NO. 1 
and indicate drive 
I 
Drive A,B,C> 
.............................................................. 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
ILLEX DISK NO. 1 is already in drive B, so just hit { b ) ,  
with no carriage return. The short form, or summary title, of 
the first of the five selected examples will now appear. 
I 
<Esc> Next Former Back Change <PgUp> <Pg Dn> 1 of 5 
ILLEX DISK NO. 1 EX1 .Doll 
THE USE OF JOINT OWNERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT PLAN OF "THE 
ORGANISATION POUR LA MISE EN VALEUR DU FLEUVE SENEGAL" 
(OMVS) AS AN EXAMPLE OF TRADING SOME SOVEREIGN PRIVILEGES 
IN ONE'S OWN COUNTRY IN EXCHANGE FOR BEING FREE OF 
COMPARABLE CONSTRAINTS IN ANOTHER COUNTRY. ( #  EOll) 
I 
Print Whole ( End of Entry ) 
In the upper right corner of the screen the phrase "1 of 
5" means that you are looking at the first of the five examples 
in ILLEX that satisfied the search request. To look at the 
title, or short form, for the second example use the "Next" 
command from the list of possibilities given on the top line on 
the screen. To use the "Next" command, just type the letter 
{n). It can be upper case or lower case, and you do not need a 
carriage return. After you type {n), the screen will show the 
title of the second of the five ILLEX examples selected. 
<Esc> Next Former Back Change <PgUp> <Pg Dn> 2 of 5 
ILLEX DISK NO. 1 EX3 .DO3 
THE 1978 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AS AN 
EXAMPLE OF SEPARATING THE ISSUES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND 
SECURITY, THUS ALLOWING PRODUCTIVE TRADEOFFS. ( #  E032) 
Print Whole ( End of Entry ) i 
To move on to the third of the five selected examples, 
type In) again. 
<Esc> Next Former Back Change <PgUp> <Pg Dn> 3 of 5 
ILLEX DISK NO. 1 EX4 .DO4 
THE 1958-1961 ICELANDIC FISHERIES DISPUTE AS AN EXAMPLE OF 
SEPARATING ISSUES AND SUBSEQUENT TRADEOFFS. ( #  E047) 
Print Whole ( End of Entry ) 
To see the fourth of the five selected examples, type 
{n) once more. 
I 
<Esc> Next Former Back Change <PgUp> <Pg Dn> 4 of 51 
ILLEX DISK NO. 1 EX4 . ~ 0 4  1 
I 
THE 1973 DE LA PLATA RIVER AGREEMENT BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND 
URUGUAY AS AN EXAMPLE OF SEPARATING ISSUES, OF TRADEOFFS, 1 
AND OF JOINT OWNERSHIP. ( #  E048) 1 
I 
I Print Whole ( End of Entry ) 1 
And to see the last of the five selected examples, type 
{n) one last time. 
<Esc> Next Former Back Change <PgUp> <Pg Dn> 5 of 5 
ILLEX DISK NO. 1 EX5 .DO7 
THE 1986 LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT TREATY AS AN 
EXAMPLE OF TRADING OFF THE ISSUES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND 
OPERATIONAL CONTROL. ( #  E055) 
Print Whole ( End of Entry ) 
Let us now go back to the third of the five examples and 
look at it in more detail. To go backwards through the group 
of five selected examples, use the "Former" command. To use 
the "Former" command, simply type {f). The summary of the 
fourth example will appear. 
<Esc> Next Former Back Change <PqUp> <Pg Dn> 4 of 5 
I 
ILLEX DISK NO. 1 EX4 .DO4 
THE 1973 DE LA PLATA RIVER AGREEMENT BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND 
URUGUAY AS AN EXAMPLE OF SEPARATING ISSUES, OF TRADEOFFS, 
AND OF JOINT OWNERSHIP. ( #  E048) 
Print Whole ( End of Entry ) 1 
I 
Type {f) again, and the summary of the third example will 
appear. 
I 
<Esc> Next Former Back Change <PgUp> <Pg Dn> 3 of 51 
ILLEX DISK NO. 1 EX4 .DO41 
I 
I T H E  1958-1961 ICELANDIC FISHERIES DISPUTE AS AN EXAMPLE OF j 
 SEPARATING ISSUES AND SUBSEQUENT TRADEOFFS. ( #  ~ 0 4 7 )  I 
Print Whole ( End of Entry ) 
To see the more detailed information contained in II,J,EX 
for this example, we have to change the "output content" from 
the short form we selected earlier, back to a more complete 
form. To do this use the "Change" command, which you do by 
simply typing {c). The "Choose Output Content" menu that we've 
seen before will now pop up on the bottom of the screen. 
<Esc> Next Former Back Change <PgUp> <Pg Dn> 3 of 5 
ILLEX DISK NO. 1 EX4 . DO4 
THE 1958-1961 ICELANDIC FISHERIES DISPUTE AS AN EXAMPLE OF 
SEPARATING ISSUES AND SUBSEQUENT TRADEOFFS. ( #  E047) 
CHOOSE OUTPUT CONTENT 
F1 - Whole entry, including markers and key words 
F2 - Entry without markers or key words 
F3 - Short form (between *C and first * )  
Press ENTER, F1, F2, or F3 > 
If you now hit F1, you will see the first screen for the 
whole entry. 
I 
<Esc> Next Former Back Change <PgUp> <Pg Dn> 3 of 51 
ILLEX DISK NO. 1 EX4 .DO4 1 
I 
*c i 
THE 1958-1961 ICELANDIC FISHERIES DISPUTE AS AN EXAMPLE OF I 
SEPARATING ISSUES AND SUBSEQUENT TRADEOFFS. ( #  E047) I 
* 
In 1958 Iceland precipitated a dispute with the United 
Kingdom by announcing that Iceland would extend its 
territorial limits from four to twelve miles offshore. The 
ocean newly enclosed by the twelve-mile boundary would be 
closed to UK fishing. UK fishermen ignored the Icelandic 
position which led to several incidents involving the 
Icelandic Coast Guard, UK trawlers, a UK destroyer at one 
point, and gunfire at another. 
I "Tension eased, however, when Iceland announced that i ? had 
planned to raise the matter of territorial limits at the UN I 
Law of the Sea Conference scheduled for 1960. I 
"The Conference met from March to April but failed to 
officially extend off-shore fishing limits. The UK then 
i 
suggested bilateral talks be held and agreed to halt fishing1 
activity in the disputed I 
Print Whole <sp> = more 
Notice that at the bottom where it used tn say "(End of 
Entry)" it now says "<sp> = more." What the new phrase means 
is that you should hit the space bar if you want to see more of 
this example. If you do hit the space bar, here is what you 
will see. 
<Esc> Next Former Back Change <PgUp> <Pg Dn> 3 of 5 
ILLEX DISK NO. 1 EX4 .DO4 
waters while negotiations were in progress. Agreement was 
reached in 1961: the UK dropped its objections to the 
12-mile limit, and Iceland agreed to allow British vessels 
to operate in the area during specified months of the year. 
Icelandic policy led to a renewed dispute on these issues 
ten years later." 
The 1961 agreement thus separated the issue of sovereignty 
from that of fishing rights, allowing a trade where Iceland 
was satisfied on the sovereignty issue and the UK got 
fishing rights that it considered acceptable. 
i 
I 
Robert Lyle Butterworth (with Margaret E. Scranton), I 
"Managing Interstate Conflict, 1945-74: Data with SynopsesrWl 
University Center for International Studies, University of I 
Pittsburgh, 1976, p. 248 I 
1 LAST MODIFIED: McDonald - 4/13/88 - checked i 
l~rint Whole <sp> = more 
I 
i 
.............................................................. 
.............................................................. 
From the bottom of the screen, you will notice we are 
not yet at the "(End of Entry)." Hitting the space bar one 
more time gives: 
I 
<Esc> Next Former Back Change <PgUp> <Pg Dn> 3 of 51 
ILLEX DISK NO. 1 EX4 . DO4 1 
I 
*K 
# E047 / EXAMPLES/ CREATIVE COMPROMISES/ SEPARATING ISSUES/ I 
TRADEOFFS / BOUNDARIES / 
FISHING / SOVEREIGNTY / UNITED KINGDOM / UK / ICELAND / 
INTERNATIONAL / WET I I 
*E 
Print Whole ( End of Entry ) 
Now we're at the end of the 1958-1961 Icelandic 
Fisheries Dispute example. If you want to read it again from 
the beginning, use the "Back" command by typing {b). If you 
want to go on to the fourth of the five selected examples, use 
the "Next" command by typing {n). You will see the first 
screen of the full form of the 1973 de la Plata River Agreement 
example. 
If you want to change back to the "short form" at any 
time, use the "change" command by typing {c). Then hit F3 to 
reset the machine to the short form. 
Whenever you tire of the five selected examples, hit the 
"Escape" key, which will return you to the "Search Results 
Menu." From there you can start another search by hitting F6. 
If, however, you would rather stop at this point, hit the 
Escape key once more to get back to the "Main Menu," then once 
more again to get back to the "Start-Up Menu," and then one 
final time to get back to the operating system's "A>" prompt. 
Then take out the diskettes and turn off the machine. 
If you feel an urge to save the results of this search 
for future reference, fight it. With a little practice, you 
will find it becomes easier to reproduce simple searches than 
to keep results well organized on floppy diskettes. If you 
would like a copy of the search material printed out, that is 
straightforward. It is well described in the FYI 3000 Plus 
manual, so the reader is referred to that source at this point. 
5. SUMMARY 
In order to solicit comments and criticisms at an early 
stage, this Working Paper has described work in progress on 
building a computer database of illustrative negotiating 
successes relevant to managing international river basins. Any 
and all comments on either the substance of the work, or its 
presentation in this paper, will be very welcome. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Vocabulary of Keywords 
(Note: If you use the computer to look at the full ILLEX 
vocabulary, following the instructions in the FYI 3000 Plus 
users manual, you will find the first computer screen is not 
exactly the same as the beginning of this appendix. Instead 
the computer version starts with a lot of codes: 
This is because each entry in ILLEX has been given a unique 
code, which is included in both the entry's summary title - and 
its set of keywords. Because they are included as keywords, 
the codes get included by ILLEX in its vocabulary. And it is a 
peculiarity of the FYI 3000 Plus software that because the 
codes begin with the special symbol, " # , "  they get included at 
the beginning of the vocabulary. Because the codes are more of 
a nuisance than a help for someone perusing the vocabulary, 
they were purposely left out of the listing in this appendix.) 
Number o f  
Appearances Keyword 
AGREEMENT FOR THE FULL UTILISATION OF THE NILE WATERS 
AID 
ALGERIA 
ALPER, DONALD K. 
ANALYTIC EXPENSES 
ANTARCTICA 
ARGENTINA 
AUCTIONS 
AUSTRALIA 
AUSTRIA 
BEAGLE CHANNEL 
BELGIUM 
BENDAHMANE, DIANE B . 
BENIN 
BINATIONAL ENTITY FOR YACYRETA 
BOLIVIA 
BOTSWANA 
BOUNDARIES 
BOUNDARY WATERS TREATY 
BRAZIL 
BROWNELL, HERBERT 
BULGARIA 
BUTTERWORTH, ROBERT LYLE 
BYELOYRUSSIA 
CAMEROUN 
CANADA 
CANO, GUILLERMO J .  
CFCS 
CHAD 
CHILE 
CHLORINE 
CHLOROFLUOROCARBONS 
COLORADO RIVER 
COLUMBIA RIVER 
COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY 
COMMISSION FOR TECHNICAL COOPERATION IN AFRICA 
COMPENSATI ON 
CONTINGENT AGREEMENTS 
COOPERATIVE TACTICS 
COST ALLOCATION 
CREATIVE COMPROMISES 
CSSR 
CTM 
CYPRUS 
CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
DE LA PLATA RIVER 
DEFINITIONS 
DEL PLATA BASIN 
DENMARK 
DIOXIN 
DISCOUNT RATES 
DIVIDE-AND-CHOOSE 
DONORS 
DRY 
DUMANOSKI, DlANNE 
EATON, SAMUEL D. 
EBY 
EC 
EC E 
ECONOMlC COMMISSION FOR EUROPE 
EEC 
EGYPT 
EQUAL BENEFITS 
EQUAL BURDENS 
EQUAL COSTS 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITlES 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 
EXAMPLES 
FACILITIES 
FAIR DIVISlON 
FEDERAL REPUBLlC OF GERMANY 
FINANCIAL FUND FOR THE DEL PLATA BASIN DEVELOPMENT 
F 1 NLAND 
FIRE PROTECT1 ON 
FISHER, ROGER 
F13HING 
FLOOD CONTROL 
FLOODING 
FLOW REGULATION 
FONPLATA 
FRANCE 
FRG 
GDR 
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
GODANA. BONAYA ADHI 
GREECE 
GU I NEA 
HAAS, PETER M. 
HASHIMOTO , T . 
HUNGARY 
HYDROELECTRICITY 
ICELAND 
I lASA 
IJC 
INCREMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
INDIA 
INDUS WATER TREATY 
1NTERNAL BARGAINING 
INTERNATIONAL 
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER 'COMMISSION 
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
INTERNATIONAL JOINT COMMISSION 
INTERVENOR WITH RE30URCES AND INTEREZTS 
INTERVENTION 
IRRIGATION 
ISRAEL 
I TA I PU TREATY 
ITALCONSULT 
ITALY 
IVORY COAST 
JAPAN 
JOB TRAINING 
JOINT ANALYSIS 
JOINT OWNERSHIP 
JORDAN. WILLIAM J .  
JOYNER, CHRISTOPHER C. 
KENYA 
KIMBALL, LEE A. 
KONKEL, R. STEVEN 
KRUTILLA, JOHN V. 
LAKE VICTORIA 
LAND USE 
LAW OF THE SEA 
LAX, DAVID A. 
LEBANON 
LEGAL EXPENSES 
LEMAROUAND , DAVID G . 
LESOTHO 
LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT 
LIBYA 
LIECHTENSTEIN 
LUXEMBOURG 
MAL I 
MALTA 
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY 
MAURITANIA 
MCDONALD. JOHN V . ,  JR. 
MEDITERRANEAN ACTION PLAN 
MEDITERRANEAN SEA 
MEHTA , J . S . 
MEXICO 
MILITARY THREATS 
MINERALS 
MINING 
MIT 
MIXED TECHNICAL COMMISSION FOR SALT0 GRANDE 
MONACO 
MONAHAN, ROBERT L .  
MONITORING 
MOROCCO 
MOZAMBIQUE 
NATIONAL 
NATURAL RESOURCES 
NAVIGATION 
NETHERLANDS 
NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
NEW ZEALAND 
NGUYEN , OUAC- LAN 
NICKSON, R .  ANDREW 
NIGER 
NIGER RIVER 
NIGER RIVER BASIN AUTHORITY 
NIGERIA 
NILE RIVER 
MORVAY 
NUCLEOLUS 
ODOR CONTROL 
OERS 
OIL RESGURCES 
OKADA, N. 
OMVS 
ORGANISATION DES ETATS RIVERAINS DE SENEGAL 
ORGANISATION POUR LA MISE EN VALEUR DU FLEUVE SENEGAL 
OVENS FALLS DAM AGREEMENT 
OZONE 
PAK I STAN 
PALEST IN1 AN3 
PANAMA 
PANAMA CANAL 
PARAGUAY 
PARANA RIVER 
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
POLAND 
POLLUTION 
POPE 
PRC 
PRINCEN, THOMAS 
PRINCEN, THOMAS E. 
PROFIT SHARING 
PROPORTIONAL BENEFITS 
PROPORTIONAL BURDENS 
PROPORTIONAL COSTS 
PROPORTIONAL NUCLEOLUS 
PUBLICATIONS 
RAIFFA, HOWARD 
RECREATIONAL FACILITIES 
RISK AVERSION 
ROYALTIES 
SADCC 
SALINITY 
SCRB 
SEBENIUS, JAMES K. 
SECURITY 
SENEGAL 
SENEGAL RIVER 
SEPARABLE COSTS - REMAINING BENEFITS 
SEPARATING ISSUES 
SEWAGE TREATMENT 
SHAPLEY VALUE 
SINGLE NEGOTIATING TEXT 
SITING 
SKAGIT RIVER VALLEY TREATY 
SMT 
SOLE. M . E .  
SOUNI~PROOFI NG 
SOUTH. AFR I CA 
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION CONFERENCE 
SOVEREIGNTY 
SOVIET UNION 
SPAIN 
STEIN, JANICE GROSS 
STEINHAUS PROCEEURE 
STREET REPAIRS 
SUDAN 
SULPHUR 
SUEDEN 
SWITZERLAND 
SYRIA 
TANZANIA 
TERRITORY 
THIRD-PARTY ANALYSIS 
TRADEOFFS 
TUNISIA 
TURKEY 
U . 5 .  CONGRESS 
UGANDA 
UK 
UNEP 
UNITED KINGDOM 
UNITED NATI ON5 
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME 
UNITED STATES 
UPPER VOLTA 
TJRUGUAY 
URUGUAY RIVER 
URY, WILLIAM 
USA 
USER FEES 
USSR 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
VAN ROBBRGECK, T.P.C. 
VAT 1 CAN 
VOTING POWER 
WALSH, JOHN 
WATER ALLOCAT I ON 
WATER OUALITY 
UATER STORAGE 
WATER SUPPLY 
WEAK NUCLEOLUS 
VET 
WORLD BANK 
YOUNG, H .  PEYTON 
-fUGOSLAVIA 
ZAC P LAN 
ZAMBEZI ACTION PLAN 
ZAMBEZI RIVER 
ZAMBIA 
ZlMBAEtiE 
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4 1; 
T H E  LAW 1JF THE SEA A' AN EXAMPLE OF FAIR DIVISION USING THE 
DIVIDE-AND-CHOOEE METHOD ( # EOOl J 
* 
One of the issues dealt with in the 1962 Law of the Sea 
Conventi:,n is deep-rea mininq of mangenes? nodules on t h ~  ? : P E ~  
floor. The Convention establishes rules for deep-sea mining 
Private and state companies. It also establishes an 
international mining entity called the "Enterprise." The initial 
~ o s i t i o n  ? f  most Third-World countries was that the Enterprise 
should be the sole exploiter of seabed resources. Most developed 
countries preferred that the Enterprise bs little more than a 
claims registry to facilitate mining by private and state 
z o m ~ a n i e s  . 
The eventual compromise is. amcng other t h i n s ~ . ,  an example of the 
divide-and-rhoass principle of f ~ . i r  diviaion. Tne Convention 
creates a parallel system. Privet? and state companies can min?. 
5 0  can ths E n t e r p r j ~ e .  However, r e l ~ t i v t  ta e'istjns c?mpsnjrs 
wlth their e s t ~ b l i s h e d  expertiae and technclcsy, the Enterprice 
is at E d j s ; d v ~ n t ~ g $  jn identifvin? cnd ex.~l:,rjn3 S J . ! P E .  Thus 2 
"first come, first serve" rule for claiming sites would likely 
lead tz1 the Enterprise bein? forever one step behind 51-13 left 
with the worst sites. The Conventicn, therefcre, eventually 
inc3r~.>rs ted 3 dil-ide-?,nd-chz~ose sys tern A comp!ny wjshjna tc 
mine must define two mining sites in its applications. The 
Enterprise then chorscs one t c ~  reserve for current 3r future 
development by the Enterprise. The c o m p ~ n v  czn mint the other 
Thus thc aPPJ i:ant c o r n ~ a n ~  is th? "divider;" the Enterprise iz 
the "chooser." 
The Law of the Sea: United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea. Unjtej Nstions. NY [Annex 111. Art1:le 6 ,  p ,  1133 
James K Sebenius. Negctietinj the Law of the S e a ,  Hcrvard 
University Press. CamtsrijQe. I"la5schusetts. 1 9 8 4  
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T H E  MEDITERRANEAN ACTION PLAN A S  AN EXAMPLE OF TRADING CJPF 
POLLUTION CONTROLS FOR TECHNOLClGY TRANSFER. ( #  EOO2) 
In the Mediterranean A ~ t i ~ n  Plan ~MedPIsn', fa:ilitzted f r : ~  the 
start by the United Nations Environment Prosramme rUNEP1, the 
northern developed csuntries ?:anted psllutjsn ci.ntrols 
Southern. developing countries such as klgeriz end Egypt saw s u c h  
contrzls, ~artjcularlv on shoreline j n d u s t r ~ e s ,  as hjn3erinq 
their economic development end therefcre undrsireble. 
In the end the southern. develo~ina r2untries 3arefd t o  s u r h  
contrcls. One cf the things they gct in return from the 
developed countries was knswledge and technology tr3nsier to h e l p  
establish in their own ideveloping) countries ocean monitoring 
and research facilities and expertiso 
References: 
Peter M. Haas, "Dishonorable Discharges: International 
Collab~ratian for Mediterranean Pollution Ccntrc.1." Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology P h . D .  Thesis, February, 1 9 8 6  
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tt EOUZ / EXAMPLES i CREATIVE COMPAOMISEE / 
MEDITEERANLAN ZEA / MEDITERRAJJEAIJ ACTION PLAII I 
POLLUTION / TRAPEOFFS / NATUEAL RE'CURiES / 
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THE PIEDITERRANEAN ACTION PLAN AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN INTEF.i;ENOF: LiITH 
REZOURCES AND INTERESTS. ~ t t  E6U5 1 
* 
The Mediterraneen Action Plan was facjl~teted from the stjrt bv 
the Unite3 Natlons Enair2nment Proqramme !UNEPI 1JNEF wsz a new 
agency at the time and had an interest in reaching an agreement 
that was visible and impressive and would establish i t  as a 
significant player in intern~tional relations 
In pursuing an agreement, UNEP u ~ e d  its money t~ fund studies, 
research, and conferences in countries which were hesitant and 
whose Participation in the negotiation UNEP wanted to maintain 
At important points in the negotiations, such funds proved an 
important inducement in maintaining participation of some 
hesitant countries. 
References 
Peter M. Haas, "Dishonorable Discharges: International 
collaboration for Mediterranean Polluticn Control " Massachu~etts 
Institute of Technologv P h . E  Thecis. Februarv. 1 9 8 6  
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THE INDUS WATER TREATY AS AN EXAMPLE OF AN INTERVENOR WITH 
RESOURCES AND INTERESTS. t # E003, 
* 
The 1 9 6 6  Indus Wzter Treaty resolved a problem created bv the 
1 9 4 8  partition of the Indian Empire Into India and Paki~.tan Th? 
World Fank ~ 3 5  the critical intervenor. The World Eank had En 
interest, sonsiitent with its own rharter, in en a a r e e ~ 1 5 t  thzt 
would develop the resources of the Indus River. As its principzl 
inducement f.>r an egreement the world Bcnk offered Indjz 3nd 
Pakistan the prospect of majcr financial suppcrt It 21sc 
persuaded kustrel is. C a n ~ d a .  New Zealand. the Fejeral R e ~ u k ~ l  i c  ~f 
Germany, the United Kingdom and the United Stctes to p l ~ d g e  
a 3d i t j lna 1 gr: n t s and 15ans 
The World Fank.5 technical expertise alsc facilitated the 
negotiations Thc wnrld Bank jnd Western ccuntries 8 1 5 2  h s d  s n  
interest in avoiding an IndiatFakistan war over the Indus. 
References: 
J 5. Mehta, "The Indus Water Treaty ias a case study in the 
Resolution of International River basin  conflict^." ~n The 
Management of International River Bssin Conflicts. Proceedings of 
a Workshop held at the Headquarters of the International 
Institute for Applied Svstems Analysis. Laxenburg, Austria, 
September 22-25, 1 9 8 6 ,  Evan Vlsch~?s. Anne C Webb, and Irene L 
Murphy (Eds.1, Graduate Program in Science, Technology, and 
Public Policy, The George Washington University. Washington. Dt 
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# E004 1 EXAMPLES / COOPERATIVE TACTICS / 
INTERVENOR WITH RESOURCES AND INTERESTS 1 WORLD BANK ! 
INTERVENTIQN / NATURAL RESClVRCES 1 
INDUS WATER TREATY / INDIA / PAKISTAN / 
WATER ALLcC,ATION / MILITARY THREATS / 
INTERNATIONAL / WET 
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THE "30% CLUB" AS AN EXAMPLE OF FAIR DIVISION BASED ON THE 
PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONAL BURDENS. ( t  E005) 
* 
In 1985 a number of E u r ~ p e a n  countries plus Canada signed a 
~rotocol obliging them to the followina sulphur emission 
reductions as a specific step in implementing the November 13, 
19?9 Geneva Convention on Lonse-range Transboundary Air 
Pollution. Each agreed to reduce its national sulphur emissions 
or its transboundary flux by a t  least 30% by 1333 a t  the ]?test 
using 1980 as the basis for calculating  reduction^. 
As of mid-1988, the Protzc31 haj been ratifjed bv kuatria. 
Byeloyrussia. Canada. Czechoslovakis. Denmark. the Federal 
Republic of G?rmanv, Finlsnd, Frsncs, H u n a a r y ,  Liezhtenstein 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden. Switzerlsnd, and the 
USSR. It had a 1 5 z ~  b2en signed, though nst v e t  ratjiied. t.T? 
Eelgium, the German Democratic Republic. and Italy. 
References 
"Protoccl on the Atduction of Sulphur Emigsiona or Their 
Transboundary Fluxes b y  at Lssst jif Per Cent ': lulv 6 ,  1,755. 
United Nations Document ECEIEE.AIEi12. International tligest o f  
Health Legislation 36 !I3851 7 3 9  
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SWEDEN / SWITZERLAND / SOVIET UNIGN / USSR 1 FINLAND / FRANCE / 
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC / GDR / 
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* C  
THE ITAIPU TREATY AS AN EXAMPLE OF COST ALLOCATION AND FAIR 
DIVISION BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EOUAL COSTS AND EQUAL 
EENEFITS. i #  E006) 
* 
The 1973 Itaipu Treatv between Brazil and Paraguay provides for 
the financing, ccnstruction, an3 mangqement 9f the Itdipu 
hydroelectric project an the Parcna River between the two 
countries. 
Its provisions include an example of equally allocating costs in 
that each partv had to put U P  5050 of the 2 8 ~ 1  tal (The treatv 
also included a loan from Brazil to Paraguay so that Peraguav 
could cover its half.) The treaty also includes an example of 
equal benefits in that the electricity produced is divided 
esuallv between the two countries. 
References 
A. Andrew Nickson, "The Itaipu Hydro-Electric Project: The 
Paraguayan Perspective." Latin American Research, Vol. 2 No. 1 .  
May 1962  
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THE DEVELOPMENT PRlIGRAM OF "THE ORGANISATION POUR LA MI5E EN 
VALEUR DU FLEUVE 5EIJEGAL" ! O k l ' i S t  AS AN EXAMPLE OF TFrAfiEOFFS 
INVQLVING MULTIPLE PROJECTS TC PROVIDE HYDROELECTRICY AND IMPROVE 
NAVIGATION, WATER QUALITY WATER SUPPLY, AND FLOW REGULATIUN ~r 
Ed07 
* 
The Organication pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Senegal iOMV5, 
was formed in 1 9 ? 2  bv Mali. Maurjtenia, and Senegal to p r ~ v j d e  
for integrated development of the Senegal River. The development 
program OMVS came up with is an example of tradeoffs among the 
three countries. The current progrem has four projects: 11. a 
hvdroelectric storage dam at Manantali in Mali scheduled for 
completion in 1 9 6 8 ;  2 )  an anti-salt and water storage barrier, 
completed in 1 9 8 5 ,  at Diama between Mauritania and Senegal near 
the mouth of the river; 3 )  development of river navigation from 
St. Louis, Senegal at the mouth of the river to Ksyes in Mali; 
and 4 )  a river-maritime port at 5t. Louis, a port at Kayes, as 
well as port facilities at 10 stops along the river. The 
Manantali hydroelectricity and regulation of river flow will 
benefit everyone. But the faci1ity.s location in Mali is sten b y  
Mali as an added benefit to itself. The Diama dam benefits only 
Mauritania and Senegal directly. The navigaticn improvements 3re 
P r o b ~ b l y  of more benefit to Mali, the u~strearn ccuntrv, th?ugh 
the maritime improvements at St. Louis probably benefit 
Mauritania and Senesal independent of their zontributjsn t ?  r j v e r  
navigation. 
The OMVS's predecessor, the Orgznisation des Etats riverains de 
Senegal (OERSi, had floundered for several reasons One of them 
was that this set of projects had no project for Guinea. which 
was a partizipant in OERS, but not yet in OMV3. Guinea 
frustrated progress in OERS, and Senegal eventually initiated 
OMVS instead to qet things moving. 
References: 
David G .  LeMarsuand, "International Development of the Senegel 
River." in The Management of International River basin Confljcts. 
Proceedings of a Workshop held at the Headquarters of the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, 
Austria, September 22-25. 1966, Evan Vlachos. Anne C .  Webb, and 
Irene L .  Murphv iEds , .  Graduste Pr2eram in Science. T e r h n o l o s ~ .  
and Public Policy, The George Washington University, Washington. 
DC L'005L 
John Walch, "A Prclect born of Hcpe. Desperaticn," Science Vcl 
2 . 3 2 ,  Mav 3C1, 1380, PP 1 0 9 1 - 1 0 8 5  
LAST MGDIFIED. McDonald - 1/6/66 - checked 
* K  
r Ed07 / EXAMPLES 1 CREATIVE COMPROMISES I 
ORGANISATION PilUR LA MISE EN VALElIR rlU ELEVVE 5EhEGAL 
OMVS / SENEGAL RIVER / NATURAL RESOURCES / 
SENEGAL / MAURITANIA / MALI / GUINEA 1 
ORGANISATION DES ETATS RIVERAINS DE SENEGAL 1 OERS i 
TRADEOFFS 1 HY~IROELECTRICITY / FACILITIES 
NAVIGATION / WATER STORAGE / IRRIGATION 1 FLOOD CONTROL 1 
FLOW REGULATIDN t WATER OUALITY / 5ALINIT.i / 
INTERNATIONAL i WET 
*C 
THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF "THE ORGANISATION POUR LA MISE EN 
VALEUR DU FLEUVE SENEGAL" (OMVS) AS AN EXAMPLE OF TRADEOFFS 
ALLOWING DONORS T O  TARGET THEIR MONEY A S  A CONDITION FOR 
PROVIDING THE FUNDS. ( 4 l  E008i 
* 
The development program of the Organisation pour la mise en 
valeur du fleuve Senegal (OMVS) in the Senegal basin is financed 
by mainly Arab and European doncr countries. Entry r E007 
describes some of the tradeoffs among the basin states. There 
are also tradeoffs between UMVS and various donors. One example 
is that typically 80% of tied aid is then spent in the donor 
country. A second example is where, in exchange for a nation 
funding the OMVS, the OMVS agreed to those funds being targeted 
to a Part of the development program of particular interest to 
the funder. In the Senegal basin, France's main interest end 
financing is for the Diama dam. This helps maintain France.5 
involvement and influence in its former colonial Ereas of the 
lower Senssal valley. In zontrast, the FRG.5 main int2rssts 3.nd 
money are for the Mananteli hydroelectric and storage dam in 
Mali. The FRG first became interested in this dam as pzrt of j ts 
industrial interest in exploiting iron ore reserves in the upper 
basin. 
Note that the financing term5 OMVS has received are so 
concessionary that the principal interest ~f a commercial lender, 
i.e. a competitive return on the loan, does not seem a main 
motivation for the funders. 
References: 
David G .  LeMarquand, "International Development of the Senegal 
River," jn Th5 Management of International River basin C2nfllcts. 
Proceedings of e Workshop held at the Headquarters of the 
Internatianal Institute for Applied 5ysterns An3lvsjsr L3xenburs 
Austria, September 22-25. 1966, Evan Vlachos. Anne C .  Webb, and 
Irene L. Murphy (Eds.), Graduate Program Science, Te:hnolo3~, 
and Public Policy, The George Washington University, Washington. 
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF "THE ORGANISATION PGUR LA MISE EN VALEUR DU 
FLEUVE SENEGAL" IOMVS) AS AN EXAMPLE GF SEPARATING ISSVES AND 
EXCLUDING THOSE ISSUES THAT PREVENT REACHING A PRODUCTIVE 
AGREEMENT. ( w  E009! 
* 
The Organisation pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Senegal (OMVS) 
was formed in 1972 by Mali, Mauritania, and Senegal to provide 
for integrated development of the Senegal River. The OMVS's 
predecessor, the Organisation des Etats riverains d e  Senegal 
(OERS), in which Guinea had also participeted, had floundered for 
several reasons. One was the inclusion of too manv issues on the 
OERS's ambitious agenda. Beyond development of the Senegal River 
the OER5 had sweeping plans for integretion in econcmic, cultural. 
and health matters. The expansive agenda in the 5nd ccntrjhuted 
to an inability to agree on the przcticel implementation of 
significant p r c ~ e c t c .  The OMVS stuzk to river deve1:pment i ~ s u e s  
and has been much more productive 
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David G .  LeMarquand, "International Development of the Senegal 
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Proceedings of a Workshop held at the Headquarters of the 
International Institute for Applied Systems knalvsis, Laxenburg. 
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FINkNCIJ\IG THE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM OF "THE ORGANISATION POVR LA 
MIEE EN VALEUR DU FLEVVE SENEGAL" 1clMiJ5 J A 5  AN E.XAMPLE ilF 
INCREMENT?.L AGREEMENTS i tl El3 1 CI J 
4 
The Orgenisation pour lz mise en veleur du fleuve Senegal iOMVE' 
w35 f~rme.3 in 1 9 7 2  by M ~ l i .  Mauritaniz. and 5 ? n e 3 ~ I  t' ~ r ~ v i d e  
for integrated development c l  the Scntgal River. The iinsncing 
package for a set of four projezts jnv2lvej more thzn 14 d2n2rs. 
scme of whom did not thjnk the set of four projects sensible. 
Hswever, the set was desirable politic~lly to ths thrte bcsin 
states, and i t  would have been difficult for them t o  break i t  up. 
Getting sufficient donors on board was a problem. By breaking up 
the initial funding problem creatively the OMVS was successful in 
involving doncrs progressively. "France, [the FRGJ, Italy. 
Canada, and the United States funded various studies that gave 
them the incentive to see through the projects to implementation 
They and other donors financed irrigation projects, which 
stimulated an interest in river regulation to increase the 
productivity of their investment." 
Also the OMVS sot French funding Principally for the Diama d3m. 
in which France had special interest (see Entry # EOOE), and FR5 
funding principally for the Manantali dam, in which the FR6 h a d  a 
special interest isee also Entry r EOO6). 
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THE USE OF JOINT OWNERSHIP IN THE DEVELOPMENT FLAN 6F "THE 
ORGANISAT1171d POUR LA MISE EN VALEUk DU FLLUi;E SENEGAL" (OM\'SI A 5  
AN EXAMPLE OF TRADING SOME SOVEREIGN PRIVILEGES IN ONE 5 OWN 
CClUIdTRY IN EXCHANGE FOR EEING FREE OF C.13MPARABLE CONSTRAINT5 IN 
ANOTHER COUNTRY. ( #  EOll) 
* 
The Organisation pcur l e  mise en vcleur du fleuve Senegzl I O M V S !  
was fsrmed in 13?2 b v  Mali. Maurjtjnis, and 5en5saI t o  pr~vjje 
for integrated development of the Senegal River. The current 
devel3pment program has fsur pro~ects: 1 1  a hvdr2ele:tric st~raa? 
dam at Manantali in M ~ l i  scheduled for completion in 1966; 2 !  an 
anti-selt and water storage barrier, completed in 13b5, a t  Diama 
between Mauritania and Senegal near the mouth of the river; 3 !  
development of river navigation from St. Louis, Senegal st the 
mouth of the river to Kayes in Mali; and 4 )  a river-maritime port 
at St. Louis, a port at Kayes, as well as port facilities at 10 
stops along the river. To resolve questions of which parties 
would own and operate the different facilities, they settled on 
joint ownership. Each party thereby sacrificed some sovereignty 
over facilities in its country to avoid the other parties being 
free to exercise normal constraints of national sovereignty on 
facilities in their countrits. 
, 
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THE MONTREAL PROTOCOL O N  THE OZONE LAYER A5 AN EXAMPLE 12F 
PROPORTIONALLY ALLOCATING FURDENS. OF ALLilZATING BUREENS E6UALL.i 
AND OF RESTRICTING OPPORTUNITIE5 EOUALLY i r  E012) 
Q 
The 198? Mzntrezl Prc,ticol to prctect the earth's ozone Izyer 
requires the parties to limit their c3nsumpti?n of 
chlorofluoroc~rbons iCFCs). The industrialized countries m u ~ t  
freeze their consumption at 1366 levels until 1934. This, is a n  
example of esuel burdens. In 1994 the m u ~ t  reduce con~umption by 
20% relative to 1386 levels. with 3 further reduction sf 3 4 %  
required in 1999. These Ere examplec of proportional burdens. 
The developing countries have a l ib-vlsr  grace ~ e r i o d  tefzrc 
starting the same kinds of reductions. 
Note that there ar? no contraints on pro3uc?raa who therefsre sll 
have equal oppcrtunities to prcvide CFCs t o  the constrained 
market 
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T H E  CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN E G Y P T  A N D  ISRAEL AS A N  
EXAMPLE OF AN INTERVEJJOR W I T H  RESOURCES AND INTEREST3. 1 Eglj! 
* 
In the 1978 Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel, the 
United States w a s  the intervenor with resources and interests 
T h e  U . S .  had m o r a l ,  political, and economic interests in 
resolving the Middle East conflict. A l s o ,  in the end the U . 5 .  
sweetened considerably the pot Egypt and Israel were trying to 
divide. T h e  sweeteners include econ2mic a i d ,  military &id, and 
arms s a l e s .  Also important were President Carter's agreement 
that the U . S .  would be a  guarantor of the treaty, " s u b ~ e c t  to 
Congressional processes," and his commitment that the U . S .  would 
monitor compliance and provide data to both s i d e s .  
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T H E  CAMP DAVID NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN EGYPT A N D  ISRAEL AS A N  
EXAMPLE O F  T H E  U S E  O F  A  S I N G L E  NEGOTIATING T E X T .  ( @  E014i 
a 
In the 1978 Camp David negotiations between Egypt and Israel, the 
United States w a s  the intervenor with resources and interests. 
"The t U . 5 . 1  mediators tried initially to get the principals to 
construct a  package o n  a n  issue-by-issue basis, but they expected 
that this strategy would not w o r k .  It d i d n ' t .  BY day two Begin 
and Sadat would not talk to each o t h s r . "  ( R a i f f ~ ,  1 9 8 : ~  T h e  
Americans then introduced the use of a  single negotieting text 
(SNT), where they would draft an entire package to be reviewed 
and critjcized by the ~ r i n c i ~ z l s .  The Americans xould return tr 
the drawing board to come up with a subsequent ccmplete packege 
attempting to respond to the criticisms. "At Camp David, the 
draft of the text on Palestinian autonomy went through 23 
revisions while the treaty between Egypt and Isrzel w a s  r ~ d r a f t e j  
eight times, largely under President Carter'= personel 
s u p e r v i s i ~ n . "  !Stein, 1985, 
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* c  
T H E  PANAMA CANAL TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AS A N  EXAMPLE O F  T H E  
PRODUCTIVE USE OF INCREMENTAL AGREEMENTS i#  E D 1 5 ,  
* 
In the negotietions in the 1970s between the United States and 
Panama over a n e w  Panama Canal T r e a t y ,  the eight Kissinger-Tack 
principles agreed to on February 7 .  1 9 7 4  are an example of an 
incremental agreement. These established a bit of a tradition of 
progress and agreement without getting bogged down by problematic 
details. T h u s  the two sides could formally sign an asreement 
stating that the n e w  treaty would have a n  eventual termination 
date, which w a s  especially important to Panama, while putting off 
agreeing to the precise date. Another principle w a s  that Panama 
would arant the U . S .  the rights necessary "to operate. maintain, 
protect and defend the c a n a l , "  without detailing those rights. 
T h i s  principle w a s  esp5cially important to the U . S .  As other 
examples, the agreement stated that Panama would participate in 
the canal administration during the treaty period, without 
sorting out the details of that participetion. T h e  agreement 
also stated both countries would participate in the protectirn 
and defense, again putting off details until later. 
T h e  progress respresented by the Kissinqcr-Tack principles i f  
given particular credit for keeping the negctiat ions on track 
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T H E  USER F E E  SCHEDULE ADOPTED BY "THE ORGANISATION POUR L A  M 1 5 E  EN 
VALEUR D U  FLEUVE SENEGAL" (OMV5) AS A N  EXAMPLE O F  COST ALLOCATION 
USING T H E  METHOD O F  SEPARABLE C03TS - REMAINING BENEFITS 1 s  
E016) 
* 
T h e  Organisetion pour la mise en valeur du fleuve Senegal IOMV5) 
w a s  formed in 1372 by M a l i ,  Mauritania. and Senegal to pr311ide 
for integrated development of the Senegal River. T h e  current 
program has four p r o ~ e c t s :  1) a hydr9electric s t ~ r a s e  dam in 
M a l i ;  2 )  a n  anti-salt and water storage barrier near the mouth of 
the r i v e r ;  3 )  development of river navigation frzm St. Louis, 
Senegal at the mouth of the river to Kayes in M a l i ;  and 4) a 
river-maritime port at St. Louis, a port at Kayes, as well as 
port facilities at 10 stops along the river. Most of the ccpital 
funding has been raised from outside dcinors. H o w e v e r ,  i t  is 
OMVS's objective that "in the final stage" operating expenses for 
all facilities will be covered by user fees. T o  recommend fair 
user fees for different goods and services i e . g .  
hydroelectricity, navigation, water for irrigation and other 
purposes) OMVS hired consultants from Utah State University. 
They used the msthod of separable c?5ts - remaining benefjts to 
propose a number of different fee structures besed on different 
assumptions about rates of 33ricultural devel3pment, csmpletitn 
dates of the facilities, increases in thermal energy coats, 
social discount rates, and hydroelectricity :9ncumptirn T h e  
process took several y e a r s ,  but in May 1981 the O M V S  Council of 
blinjsters approved a p r o v i ~ i 3 n a l  :@st alloc3tian f3rmula t,ased on 
this w o r k .  T h e  references below are not sufficiently recent to 
report h . 3 ~  smoothly i t  has been irnplementej as the facjljtjes 
have come on line. 
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FINANCING FOR A U.S. DESALTING PLANT FOR THE LOVER COLORADO RIVER 
AS AN EXAMPLE OF INTERNAL BARGAINING IN THE U . S .  NECESSARY TO 
REACH AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT WITH MEXICO. ( #  E017) 
* 
In November 1961 Mexico formally protested that the U . S .  was 
violating the 1944 V.5.-Mexico T r ~ a t y  for Utilization of Waters 
of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande. The 
charge was due to high salinity in Colsrado River water at the 
point i t  entered Mexico. The dispute was finally resolved in 
1973. As part of the resolution, which took the form of Minute 
242 of the International Boundary and Water Commission, the U . 5 .  
agreed to build, amzns other things, a $ 6 1  million dessltina 
plant. However, Congressman from the seven Colorado River basin 
states in the U . S .  wanted the agreem2nt to inzlude additicnal 
projects that would benefit their states. The U.S. 
Administration d i d  not includs the addi tisnal pro~ects in the 
agreement with Mexicc, and since the agreement was not in the 
form of a treaty, i t  d i d  nct reauire ratification by the U . S .  
Congress. However, the U 5. basin states got their way by 
prevailing on Congress to make sure the legislation needed fcr 
funding the pro~ects that were agreed to with Mesico, also funded 
the additional pro~ects benefiting the U . 3 .  b a ~ i n  st3tes. 
Thus the intern~l U . S .  political process generated a side-pcyment 
that was sufficient to gain necessary suppcrt for the extern31 
agreement by the U.S. basin states, without being unacceptably 
high for the k.jministration 
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*c 
THE OWENS FALLS DAM AGREEMENT AS AN EXAMPLE OF ACCEPTING MONEY AS 
COMPENSATION F6R FLOOD DAMAGE. ( w  EOla) 
L 
The Owens Falls Dam Agreement of 1952 between Egypt and the 
Unitsd Kinadorn concerned the construction of the Owens Fallr Lam 
in Uganda, then under British administration. The Agreement had 
two Purposes: 1) regulating flow in the Nile and 2 )  hydropower 
for Uganda. It was anticipated that the dam would raise the 
level of Lake Victoria and cause flooding in Vganda, Kenya, and 
Tanzania. Egypt agreed to compensate Uganda for flooding due to 
the dam and that "all new flooding around Lake Victoria within 
the agreed range of three meters shall be deemed to be due to the 
implementation of the scheme." Godana (Ref. 18 argues that 
international law (n.b. the "Trail Smelter" arbitration [Refs. 2 
and 3 3 )  would require Uganda to compensate Kenya and Tanzania for 
flood damage due to Uganda's dam, but that the Owens Falls Dam 
Agreement effeztively assigns tc Egypt Uganda's obligation to 
Kenya and Tanzania. 
In fact, there wes significant flooding dccurnented in Kenya after 
the dam went into operation in 1 5 6 1  F'r resszns that are not 
clear from Ref 1 ,  Uganda maintained the flooding was due to 
heavy rains and not the dam. Reference 1  does not describe any 
compensation payments being made. 
References: 
1 .  Bonaya Adhi Godana, Africa's Shared Water Resources: Legtl anJ 
Institutional Aspects of the Nile, Niger sn3 5 e n ~ g a l  River 
Systems, Frances Pinter ipublishers), London, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, I n c . ,  Boulder, C310razlo, 1985 
2 .  Trail Smelter - United Nations, "Report of Internctionel 
Arbitration Awards." Vol. 111, P .  1336. at P .  1965 
3 .  Trail Smelter arbitretion, American Journal of Internetionzl 
Law, Vol. 35, 1941, P .  684 
LAST MODIFIED: McDonald - 1 / 1 8 / 8 8  - unchecked 
*K 
4 i  ED18 / EXAMPLES 1 CREATIVE COMPROMISES / TRADEOFFS / 
COMPENSATION / FLOCDING 1 NILE RIVER 1 NATURAL RESOURCES 1 
EGYPT / UGANDA / KENYA 1 TANZANIA / UNITED KINGDOM / UK / 
OWENS FALLS DAM AGREEMENT 1 
FLOW REGULATION / HYDROELECTRICITY 1 
LAKE VICTORIA 1 
INTERNATIONAL / WET 
*c  
THE AGREEMENT FOR THE FULL UTILISATION OF THE NILE WATER' AS AN 
a 
The 1 9 5 9  Agreement for the Full Utilisetion of the Nile Water5 
between Egypt and Sudan deals with the high Aswzn dam; i t  
includes $ 4 3  million from Egypt to Sudan in compensztion fcr 
flooding due to the dam. 
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THE PROCESS OF ESTABLISHING THE NIGER RIVER EASIN AUTHURITY A 5  AM 
EXAMPLE OF AN INTERVENOR VITH RESOURCES AND INTEREST5 AMfr 1CtF 
PRODUCTIVE THIRD-PARTY ANALYSIS. iIE 0 2 0 )  
* 
The parties tc the 1 9 6 0  Convention for the Esteblishment of the 
Niger Rjver Basin Authority are the njne basin states of t h ~  
Niger River: Benin. Cameroun, Chad. Guinea, Ivory Coast, Mzli, 
Niger, Nigeria, and Upper Volta. The 1 9 8 0  ccnvention had been 
preceded by two agreements, each providing for successively more 
integration of the basin states' management and development c , f  
the river: the 1 9 6 3  Act Concerning Navigation and Economic 
C,ooperation between the States of the River Niger Basin, and the 
1 9 6 4  Agreement Concerning the River Niger Commission and the 
Navigation and Transport on the River Niger. A principal point 
of departure for these agreements was a report by an Italian 
consulting firm, Italconsult, which had been commissioned by the 
United Nations at the request of Mali, Niger. Nigeria, and Upper 
Volta. The request followed a 1 9 6 1  meeting at Seffou, Guinea of 
these four countries under the auspices of the Commission for 
Technical Cooperation in Africa. That meeting had f~cussed 
attention on the dangers of uncoordinated national projects, and 
the poor understanding of such dangers at the time. Italconsult 
was to study the consequences for other states of the national 
programs of Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Upper Volta. The 
Italconsult report was the first comprehensive study of the Niger 
River basin. Its conclusions, though not entirely 
uncontroversial, prcvided the substantive basis and 2ommsn 
reference point for negotiating the eventual series of 
agreements. 
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THE OPERATION OF THE KARIBA DAM A5 AN EXAMPLE OF EQUALLY 
ALLOCATING BENEFITS. ( 8  E021) 
* 
The Kariba Dam on the Zambezi River between Zambiz and Zimbabwe 
began 3peration in 1960. 56% of the hydroelectricitv produc$d by 
the dam is cllocated to Zambia. 50% is allocated to Zimbabwe. 
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FINANCING THE FINANCIAL FUND FOR THE DEL PLATA BASIN DEVELOPMENT 
AS AN EXAMPLE OF COST ALLOCATION BASED PARTLY ON EQUAL ALLOCATIDN 
OF COSTS, AND PARTLY ON PROPORTIONAL ALLOCATION OF COSTS. 
( #  E022) 
* 
In 1974 A r g e n t i n a ,  B o l i v i a ,  B r a z i l ,  P a r a g u a y ,  and Uruguay created 
the Financial Fund for the Del Plata basin Deoelcpment 
( F O N P L A T A ) .  T h e  fund's initial capital of 6100 m i l l i o n  w z s  
collected as follows: 3 3 . 3 %  from each of the two b i g  countries, 
Argentina and B r a z i l ,  and 11.1% from each of the three small 
countries, B o l i v i a ,  P a r a g u a y ,  and U r u g u a y .  
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Graduate P r o g r a m  in S c i e n c e ,  T e c h n o l o g y ,  and Public P o l i c y ,  T h e  
George Washington Llniversity, W a s h i n g t o n ,  DC 20052 
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T H E  CHARTER O F  T H E  INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED S Y S T E M S  
ANALYSIS A S  A N  EXAMPLE O F  E Q U A L L Y  SHARING VOTING PClWER A N D  OF 
ALLOCATING COSTS B A S E D  PARTLY ON EOUAL C O S T  A L L O C A T I O N ,  A N D  
PARTLY ON PROPORTIONAL C 0 3 T  A L L O C A T I O N .  r # EOZ 3 ) 
f 
T h e  International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis iIIASA) 
is a nongovernmental institute founded in 1572. It w a s  
originally negotiated by governments, however, w h i c h  agreed on 
v o t i n g ' r i g h t s  and a two-tiered dues s t r u c t u r e .  Each member 
organization has equal voting power, one vote each. F r o m  the 
larger countries, the two "Category A "  m e m b e r s ,  originally the 
Academy o f  Sciences of the USSR and the U . S .  National Academy of 
S c i e n c e s ,  each pay the s a m e  amount. All other m e m b e r s ,  from the 
smaller countries, are classified a s  "Category B" and pay 15% of 
the Category A dues l e v e l .  Currently IIASA has nongovernmental 
m e m b e r  organizations from A u s t r i a ,  Bulgaria, Canada, 
Czechoslovakia, the Federal Republic of G e r m a n y ,  F i n l a n d ,  F r a n c e ,  
the G e r m a n  Democratic R e p u b l i c ,  H u n g a r y ,  Italy, J a p a n ,  the 
Netherlands, P o l a n d ,  S w e d e n ,  Soviet V n i ~ n ,  and the United S t a t e s  
T h e  Royal Society of the United Kingdom w a s  a founding member 
also in 1972, but subsequentl~ withdrew. 
The financial arrangement worked well in practice until the eerly 
1 9 8 0 " s .  Then financial difficulties in Eastern European 
countries 2nd weakened political s u ~ p o r t  fcr IIASA in the U 5 
led to IIASA allowing s number of ad-hoc m~difications t c  the 
dues arrangements. 
Reference: 
"Charter of the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis," Intenational Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 
Laxenburg, Austria, 1 9 7 2  (Revised 1 9 7 8 )  
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THE YACYRETA HYDROPOWER PROJECT AS AN EXAMPLE OF EQUALLY SHARING 
COSTS ANL BEWEFIT5. ( #  En241 
* 
In 1 9 7 3  Argentina and Persguay ~ i g n e d  e treaty tc construct e 
binational hydropower project at i'azyrets zn the Parsna River 
Apparently, each country contributed half of the initial capital 
for the agency created to build the projezt, the Binational 
Entity for Yacyreta (EEY), although Argentina lent Paraguay the 
$ 5 0  million i t  needed for its share. Half of the pr2~ect's 
benefits belong to each country. 
The agreement also contains a "mirror law," whereby i f  a national 
of one country is hired in a given capacity by EBY, a national of 
the other country has to be hired in the same capacity. This 
leads to inefficiencies, made worse because of the asymmetry of 
labor force skills in the two countries. 
Reference: 
Guillermo J .  Cano, "The 'Del Plata' Basin: Summary Chronicle of 
its Development Process and Related Conflicts," in The Management 
of International River Basin Conflicts, Proceedings of a Workshop 
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A 1 9 6 1  ARGENTINAIURUGUAY TREATY AS AN EXAMPLE OF SEPARATING 
NAVIGATION ISSUES FROM OTHERS, THUS ALLOWING PRODUC,TIV 
TRADEOFFS. ( #  E025) 
In 1 9 6 1  Argentin2 and Uruguay signed a treaty resolving 2 
boundary dispute on the Uruguay River. Two different boundari~s 
were established for different purposes' one for navigation and 
one for a1 1 2ther purpos~s. 
Reference: 
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of International River Bzsin Conflicts, Proceedings of a Workshop 
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THE MIXED TECHNICAL COMMISSION FOR SALT0 GRANOE AS AN EXAMPLE OF 
DIVIDING EENEFITS EQUALLY 0 EG26i 
* 
A 1 9 7 3  agreement between Argentina and Uruguay created 
the Mixed Technical Commission for Salto Grande (CTMi tc build a 
hvdroelectric and navigation project on the Uruguay River. 50% 
of the h~droelectricity produced belongs to each country. 
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THE MASSACHUSETTS WATER RESOURCE5 AUTHORITY AS AN EXAMPLE OF 
COMPEWSATION PAYMENTS TO A COMMUNITY WHERE AN VNIlES IRABLE 
FACILITY IS SITED ( I  E027j 
t 
The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority iMWRA) serves 43 
communities in Eastern Massacusetts and in the late 1 3 6 0  5 w35 
required by the U . 5 .  Environmental Protection Agency to clean U P  
the badly polluted Boston Harbor. The 1 4 . 5  billion t.3 $ 6  billion 
overall cleanup progrem included building new primary and 
secondary sewage treatment plants costing 6 3  billion. The NwRA 
chose the town of Winthrop for the site of the sewage treatment 
plants. Winthrop filed a suit to block the plants. 
In February of 1 9 8 8  the MWRA and Winthrop reached an agreement, 
to be effective from 1 9 8 8 - 2 0 0 0 .  Winthrop agre5d to let the 
sewage treatment plants go forward, and the MWRA agreed to pay 
the town 1 2 4  million "for soundproofing homes, public work5 
projects, recreational facilities, and other projects. In 
addition, the MWRA will provide 1 2 5 0 , 0 0 0  per year for fire 
protection at Deer Island Cthe site of the plants1 from 1 9 8 8  to 
1 9 9 5 ,  provide job training for Winthrop r5sidents and Pay for 
street repairs caused by MWRA-generated traffic. Other terms 
include an agreement by the MWRA to reimburse Winthrop for legal 
and technical expenses incurred in its 13wsujt, to install odor 
control equipment at the facility and to cease using chlorine a t  
its existing Deer Island facility by 1993." (The Fatrizt Lejgar. 
1988) 
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THE GARABI HYDROELECTRIC PROJECT A 5  AN EXAMPLE OF D I V I P I N B  
BENEFITS EQUALLY. ( s  ECZa! 
* 
The Garabi hydroelectric project on the Upper Uruguay River i s  a 
bilateral undertaking of Argentina and Brazil. Each wjll get 5 i l %  
of the electricity produced. 
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THE RONCADOR HYDROELECTRIC PRtJJELT AS AN EXAMPLE OF DIVIDING 
BENEFITS EQUALLY. ( r  E029j 
* 
The Roncador hydroelectric project on the Upper Uruguay River is 
a bilateral undertaking of Argentina and Brazil Each will get 
S O W  of the electricity produced. 
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T H E  LAW O F  T H E  SEA AS AM EXAMPLE OF CONTINGENT AGREEMENTS i #  
E030) 
t 
One of the issues dezlt with in the 196Z L a w  of the Sea 
Convention is deep-sea mining of manganese nodules 2n the ccean 
floor T h e  Convention establishes rules for deep-sez mining by 
private and state companies. It also establishes a n  
international mining entity called the "Enterprise." A 
particularly difficult negotiation concerned the ~ s v m e n t s  (fees. 
royalties, and profit shares) that mining companies would be 
required to pay to the Enterprise. Many developed countri5s 
argued that mining operat ions would yield only modest returns. 
Requiring large payments to the Enterprise could make mining toc 
unprofitable for anyone to proceed. Many developing countries 
expected mining to be extremely profitable and wanted to as5ur5 
that the international community shared in those profits. T h u s  
they fa,vored higher required payments w h i c h ,  g i v e n  their 
expectations, would still lejve enough profit to a mining c o m ~ e n ~  
to make mining well worth its w h i l e .  
T h e  compromise eventually worked out is an example of e 
czntingent agreement. It takes advantage of t h ~  txo jjfierent 
sets of expectations by setting two payment schedules, one to 
apply in the event of modest returns and the other in the errent 
of larger returns. T h e  first schedule includes a 2 %  royalty z n d  
the following profit sharing. T h e  Enterprise receive5 35% ?f 
profits up to a 10% return on investment, 4 2 . 5 %  of Frofits 
representing a 10% to 20K return, and 5OaI0 of remaining profits 
"The second . . .  schedule is triggered w h e n  the overall cash f l ~ w  .z:f 
the operation, cumul3ted forward with a 10J/o rtal rate is 
sufficient to recover the preproduction investment ialso 
cumulated with interest)." ISebenius, p p  39-40! It2 r'yslty 
rate is 4%, with profit sharing oi 4O0io on profits up to a 10% 
return, 50% o n  profits representjng a 10% to 20% r e t u r n ,  s n d  7Ctk 
o n  remaining profits. 
References: 
James K .  Sebenius, Negotiating the L a w  of the S e a ,  Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1964 
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THE SYDVATTEN COMPANY IN SWEDEN AS AN EXAMPLE OF COST ALLilCATIdN 
PROPORTIONAL TO POPULATION. ( a  E031J 
* 
In the 1960s several municipalities in the Skane region of 
southern Sweden formed the Sydvatten (South Gater) Companv, an 
association for planning the long-term water supply of the 
region. BY the late 1360s Sydvatten had begun designjng a msJzr 
project for obtzining water from Lake Bolmen, a s ~ u r c e  outside 
the region that would require a tunnel 80 kilometers long. 
Since its inception and throughout the project, costs have been 
allocated among the participating municipalities in Proportion to 
their populations. 
The references examine the advantages and disadvantages cf this 
cost allocation arrangement. 
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THE 1976 CAMP DAVID ACCORDS BETWEEN EGYPT AND ISRAEL AS AN 
EXAMPLE OF SEPARATING THE ISSUES OF SOVEREIGNITY AND SECURITY, 
THUS ALLOWING PRODUCTIVE TRADEOFFS. ( a  € 0 3 2 )  
S 
Prior to the Egyptian-Israeli 1978 negotiations at Camp David, 
Israel had occupied the Egyptian Sinai Peninsula since the Six- 
Day War of 1967. At Camp David efforts to draw a boundary in the 
Sinai dividing i t  between Egypt and Israel were unsuccessful. 
However, when the boundary issue was separated into a security 
issue and a sovereignty issue, tradeoffs and a compromise proved 
possible. 
"Israel's interest lay in security; they did not want Egyptian 
tanks poised on their border ready to roll across at any time 
Egypt's interest lay in sovtreignty; the Sinai had been part of 
Egypt since the P h a r a o h s .  After centuries of domination by 
G r e e k s ,  Romans, T u r k s ,  F r e n c h ,  and British, Egypt had only 
recently gained full sovereignty and w a s  not about to cede 
territory to another foreign csnqueror. 
"At Camp D a v i d ,  President Sadat of Egypt and Prime M i n i s t e r  Begin 
of Israel agreed to a plan that would return the Sinai to 
complete Egyptian sovereignty a n d ,  by demilitarizing large a r e a s ,  
w o u l d  still assure Israeli s e c u r i t y .  T h e  Egyptian flag would f l y  
everywhere, but Egyptian tanks w o u l d  be nowhere near Israel." 
( F i s h e r  and U r y ,  p .  42-43). 
References: 
Roger Fisher and W i l l i a m  U r y ,  Getting to Y e s :  Negotiating 
Agreement Without Giving I n ,  Houghton-Mifflin C o m p a n y ,  Boston, 
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T H E  LAW OF T H E  SEA NEGOTIATIONS A S  A N  EXAMPLE OF T H E  PRODUCTIVE 
U S E  O F  THIRD-PARTY A N A L Y S I S .  I # E 0 3 3 )  
* 
One of the issues dealt w i t h  in the 1982 L a w  of the Sea 
Convention is dcep-sea mining of mang3nese ncdules on the o c e a n  
floor. A particularly difficult negotiation ccncerned the 
payments ( f e e s ,  r o y a l t i e s ,  and profit shares} that mining 
companies would be required to pay to the international 
c o m m u n i t y .  Many developed countries argued that mining 
operations would yield only modest returns. Requiring large 
payments could m a k e  mining too unprofitable for anyone to 
proceed. M a n y  developing countries expected mining to be 
extremely profitable and wanted to assure that the international 
community shared in those profits. T h u s  they favored higher 
required p a y m e n t s .  
Shortly b e f o r e  a 1978 negotiating s e s s i o n ,  a research group at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ( M I T )  published a cost 
model o f  seabed m i n i n g .  T h e  model could be used to analyze the 
future financial performance of a mining operation under 
alternative assumptions about costs, production volumes, future 
mineral prices, e t c . ,  and under alternative proposed schtdules of 
fees, royalties, and profit sharing requirements. S u b s e q u e n t l y ,  
this model became a vehicle for mutual education and exploration 
of alternatives by the n e g o t i a t o r s ,  and instrumental in a c h i e ~ i n g  
the final c o n s e n s u s .  S e b e n i u s  ( 1 9 8 4 )  attributes the 
effectiveness of the M I T  g r . 2 ~ ~  as third-party a n a l y s t s  ta their 
w o r k  being generally perceived aa i n d e p e n d e n t ,  c r e d i b l e ,  and 
a c c e s s i b l e .  A s  evidence of the M I T  m o d e l ,  s independence he :i tes 
its extended and special construction procedure, the f ~ c t  that i t  
clearly w a s  not created for the L a w  of the Sea C o n f e r e n c e  ( i t  
assumed the U . S .  tax s y s t e m  and barely m e n t i o n e d  the C o n f e r e n c e ) ,  
its reliance o n  outside s o u r c e s  for the bulk of its f i g u r e s ,  and 
the fact that its r e s u l t s  o n  seabed profitability fully pleased 
n o  delegation. N e g o t i a t o r s  had opportunities to question the M I T  
g r o u p  at s e m i n a r s ,  and m e m b e r s  of the group w e r e  o f t e n  present at 
negotiating sessions to answer q u e s t i o n s .  N e g o t i a t o r s  had full 
access to the documented version of the M I T  w o r k .  T h e  C h a i r m a n  
of the Conference Group negotiating m i n i n g  p r o v i s i o n s ,  T . T . B .  Koh 
of S i n g a p o r e ,  m a d e  particular use of the M I T  model and urged the 
different delegations to do the s a m e .  
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James K S e b e n i u s ,  Negotiating the L a w  of the S e a ,  H a r v a r d  
University P r e s s ,  C a m b r i d g e ,  M a s s a c h u s e t t s ,  1 3 8 4  
L A S T  M O D I F I E D .  M c D o n a l d  - 2 / 2 / 6 8  - checked 
* K  
E033 / E X A M P L E S  / C O O P E R A T I V E  T A C T I C S  / 
T H I R D - P A R T Y  A N A L Y S I S  / M I T  ; NATURAL R E S O U R C E S  ! 
M A S S A C H U S E T T S  I N S T I T U T E  O F  T E C H N g L O G Y  / 
LAW OF T H E  3 E k  / M I N I N G  / ROYALTIES ! PlINERAL3 i 
P R O F I T  S H A R I N G  / U N I T E D  N A T I O N S  / 
INTERNATIONAL / W E T  
* C 
T H E  LAW O F  T H E  S E A  C g N V E N T I O N  AS A N  E X A M P L E  OF T R A D l N G  OFF SHORT- 
T E R M  R E V E N U E  A G A I N S T  LONG-TERM RE'GENUE. ! %  E 0 3 4 )  
* 
O n e  of the issues dealt w i t h  in the 1982 L a w  of the Sea 
C o n v e n t i o n  is deep-sea mining of m a n g a n e s e  nodules on the ocean 
floor. A particularly difficult negotiation concerned the 
P a y m e n t s  ( f e e s ,  r o y a l t i e s ,  and profit s h a r e s )  that m i n i n g  
companies w o u l d  be required to pay to the international 
c o m m u n i t y .  T h e  c o m p r o m i s e  eventually worked out is described in 
entry E030 as a n  e x a m p l e  of a contingent a g r e e m e n t .  
It is also a n  e x a m p l e  of a tradeoff taking advantage of 
differences among the n e g o t i a t o r s  in the value each attached to 
r e v e n u e  in the n e a r  future r e l a t i v e  to revenue in the longer 
term. I n  economic t e r m i n o l o g y ,  the negotiators differed in the 
"discount rates" they applied to future r e v e n u e .  Private 
companies w o u l d  evaluate their investments by comparing after-tax 
~ , ~ v e r e i g n  na t ions returns t~ alternative current investments. " C -  
that w o u l d  receive their income before t a x e s ,  that w e r e  szpressly 
trying to create an enduring s y s t e m ,  and that in the n e g o t i a t i ~ n s  
frequently voiced concern about the w e l f a r e  of future generations 
might evaluate the revenue streams using relatively lower 
discount r a t e s .  A sharing s y s t e m  whose rates rise over time, 
giving a higher proportion of the early money to c o m p a n i e s  whc 
then value i t  the most and much higher amounts later to the 
international community, o f f e r s  a creative use of s u c h  
d i f f e r e n c e s . "  ( S e b e n i u s ,  p .  6 0 )  The agreed s y s t e m  described in 
entry 4 l  E030 d o e s  just that. While the system is a n  example of a 
contingent agreement, i t  is also a n  example of trading current 
r e v e n u e  for future revenue independent of h o w  the contingencies 
w o r k  o u t .  
R e f e r e n c e s :  
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T H E  LAW O F  T H E  SEA C O N F E R E N C E  A 5  AN E X A M P L E  OF T H E  U S E  OF A 
S I N G L E  NEGOTIATING T E X T .  ct E 0 3 5 )  
* 
"Negotiations [during the 1974-1982 United Nations L a w  of the E S E  
Conference3 proceeded on the basis of , s j n g l e  negotiating texts' 
that the committee c h a i r m e n  could modlfy on the basis of 
discussions Conference organizers intended these texts to 
provide a basis for n e g o t i a t i o n  without formally binding any 
delegation to their provisions Delegates at early session of 
the conference devoted themselves to w o r k i n g  out starting 
v e r s i o n s  of these t e x t s .  ( N o r m a l l y  a specialized g r o u p ,  such as 
the International L a w  C o m m i s s i o n ,  w o u l d  have worked for s o m e  time 
prior to a conference o n  a basic negotiating document ) BY 1978 
the conference s t i f f e n e d  the standard for a chairman's r e v i s i o n  
of the t e x t .  T h e  n e w  r u l e s  r e q u i r e d  such m o d i f i c a t i o n s  o r  
r e v i s i o n s  of the text to emerge from negotiations themselves, tc 
enjoy widespread s u p p o r t ,  and to o f f e r  'a substantially improve3 
prospect of a c o n s e n s u s .  ' I '  ( S e b e n i u s ,  p. 13). 
R e f e r e n c e s  : 
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THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AS AN EXAMPLE OF TRADING OFF 
PROVISIONS ON START-UP FUNDING FOR PROVISIONS ON SHARING EVENTUAL 
PROCEEDS. ( r  ~ 0 3 6 )  
* 
One of the issues dealt with in the 1982 Law of the Sea 
Convention is desp-sea mining cf manganese nodules on the ocean 
floor. The Convention establishes rules for deep-sea mining by 
private and state companies. It also establishes an 
international mining entity called the "Enterprise." 
Particularly difficult negotiations were those concerning, first, 
how the Enterprise would be initially funded and, second, the 
payments (fees, royalties, and profit shares) that mining 
companies would subsequently be required tc pay to the 
Enterprise. For most of negotiation, the initial funding of t h e  
Enterprise and the setting of fees, royalties, and prcfit shares 
were dealt with separately. Neither subnegotiation reached an 
agreement. After the two issues came to be ccnsidered together, 
an agreement was eventually reached. For the initial funjinj oi 
the Enterprise, the agreement included provisions closer to the 
preferences of the Third World countries than to the preferences 
of the developed countries. On the other hand, the agreed 
schedule of fees, royal ties, and profit sharss was  loser t o  the 
preferences of the developed countries. 
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THE LAW OF THE SEA CpC~NVENTICIN AS AN EXAMPLE OF TRADING FINANS IAL 
ARRANGEMENTS ON DEEP-SEA MINING AGAINST NAVIGATION FREEDOMS. i r  
E037) 
a 
Sebenius i1984) describes "the central trade" in the 1982 Law cf 
the Sea ConventiDn as that between relatively unconstrained 
freedom of navigation on the one hand, and restrictions agajnst 
unilateral exploitation of seabed mineral resources on the other. 
Freedom of navigation was particularly important to the 
developed, maritime nations. Thsy were dismayed by a trend of 
increasing restrictions on navigation being imposed by coastal 
states. Thus they were looking for a convention that would 
assure what they considered desirable, i f  not essential, freedoms 
of navigation. On the other side, "Ccloastal, straits, and 
archipelagic states cf the Third World generally do nct posses= 
the means for harvesting the [mineral resources of1 the deep 
seabed." (Sebenius, P .  81). The Third-World states therefcre 
wanted developed countries who did have the means to mine the 
ocean floor to agree to arrangements assuring that the benefits 
of deep-sea mining would be equitably shared internaticnally 
The final treaty t h ~ t  was opened for signature in December 1962 
included assurances of navigational freedoms cn the one hand. ~ n d  
regulations on ocean mining on the other, that were felt t o  
represent an acceptable trade from a l l  perspectives. 
Although the treaty had been signed by at least 118 netion:. 
developed and d~velopins, by 1384, i t  is nctew2rthy thjt t h ~  
United States did not sign despite its support just two years 
earlier. 3ebenius (1984) attributes. the U . S .  reversal to a re- 
evaluation of "the central trade" by the Administration of the 
new U . S .  President, Ronald Rcasan. In 1982 the Reagsn 
Administration valued the advantage in navigational freedoms that 
the treaty would bring l e s s  than previous Adminictrati~ns h a d  
valued i t  during their tenures. The Reagan Administration also 
valued the concessjons representej b y  the treaty's mining 
provisions more highly than had its predecessors. Thus whzt had 
been evaluated by earlier U . 3 .  sdministrations as a desirable 
trade, was judged by the Reasen Administration as undesirable. 
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A NEW YORK CITY DISPUTE AS AN EXAMPLE OF (TEMPgRARILY) SUCCESSFUL 
INTERVENTION AND A CONTINGENT AGREEMENT ON DIOXIN EMISf 1 C l N S  FROM 
A TRASH-TO-ENERGY PLANT. ( #  E038) 
4 
In 1 9 6 4  the New York City Department of Zanitaticn was proposjnq 
to build a trash-tc-energy plant in Eirocklyn. To build 2nd 
operate the plant, the Department of Sanitation needed approval 
from the New York City Board of Estimate, the elective body 
responsible for deciding whether to proceed with such plants. 
Residents in the neighborhood proposed for the plant opposed i t ,  
principally out of their concern about health risk due to dioxin 
emissions from the plant. The Department of Sanitation requested 
the New York Academy of Sciences to coordinate a meeting of 
concerned parties. As a consequence the Academy sponsored a 
mediation of the dispute. 
The Department of Sanjtation had more confidence than did the 
residents in the Department's ability to keep future jisxin 
emissions below pre-set performance standards. This difference 
in expectations about future dioxin emissions was expIsite3 b y  a 
contingent agreement that established a formal monit~ring program 
for plant emissians and required that the plant woulj be 
immediately closed down i f  emissions exceeded agreed pre-set 
standards. 
Although this ~greement was supported b y  all partie5 at the 
ccnclusion of the mediation sessions, somc 3f the resident5 
subsesuentlv changed their evaluation of the agreement. They 
therefore br2ke the agreement and file3 a lawsuit against the 
Department of Senitation to prevent the plant 
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THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION AS AN EXAMPLE OF TRADING FINANCIAL 
RISK BURDENS AMONG PARTIES WITH DIFFERENT DEGREE5 C)F RIZK 
AVERSION. ( 8  E0391 
4 
One of the issues dealt with in the 1 9 8 2  Law of the S e e  
Canvention is deep-sea mining of manganese nodules on the ocsan 
floor. A particularly difficult negotiation concerned the 
payments (fees, royalties, and profit shares) thst mining 
companies would be required to pay to the international 
community. The compromise eventually worked out is described in 
entry 8 E030 as an example of a contingent agreement, and in 
entry tb E034 as an example of a tradeoff taking advantage of 
differences among the negotiators in the value each attached to 
revenue in the near future relative to revenue in the longer 
term. It is also an example of a tradeoff taking advantage of 
differences in risk aversion. 
From the perspective of countries to whom fees, royalties, and 
profit-shares would be distributed, "Calny eventual revenue from 
seabed exploitation would be divided up among the members cf the 
world community and would not represent s major share of any 
country's income." From the perspective of a state cr private 
mining company, however, "CcJarporate investments is stabed 
mining operations . . .  could represent significant portions of their 
assets." Theory predicts that given these different 
perspectives. the companies are likely tc be more risk averse 
than the "world community." !Scbtnius, P .  1 3 4 )  Compared t:~ the 
world community then, the companies are relatively more concerned 
about being protected agajnst a big loss in an unsucrsssful 
operation, than reaping huge profits for a very successful 
operation. Both sides should like an agreement that insures the 
companies agajnst too b i g  E loss for an unsuccessful operaticn, 
in exchange for the worldwide community getting a big share of 
the profits for a very successful operation. The &greed system 
described in entry t E030 docs just that. While the system is an 
example of a contingent egreement, and cf trading current revenue 
for future revenue independent of how the contingencies work out, 
i t  is also an example of how differences in risk aversion can be 
expl3ited. 
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THE BEAGLE CHANNEL MEDIATION A S  A N  EXAMPLE OF A N  INTERVENOR W I T H  
RESOURCES AND INTERESTS. ( U  E040) 
* 
Between 1 9 7 6  and 1 9 8 4  the Vatican mediated a dispute, which had 
festered since 1 8 8 1 ,  betwen Argentina and Chile revolving around 
three islands in the Beagle Channel The Pope w a s  the official 
mediator and occasionally intervened personally. However, the 
bulk of the mediation w a s  managed by a special Vatican team 
appointed by the P o p e .  Though the mediation took m u c h  longer 
than the six months predicted at the outset, i t  resulted 
successfully in a treaty ratified in 1 9 8 5 .  Moreover, throughout 
the mediation and subsequently, hostilities, which w e r e  imminent 
in 1 9 7 8 ,  were avoided. 
T h e  Vatican came into the dispute largely due to its interest in 
securing peace, p a r t i z u l a r l ~  between two Catholic countries. 
Once in the midst of mediation the Vatican came to have a n  
additional important interest jn a s u c ~ e s s f u l  ~ u t c o m e  - -  avoidjng 
the damage a failed medjation would have c n  the Pope's ability tc 
influence world affairs in the future? 
T h e  principel resource the Vatican brought to the mediation w z s  
the moral authority of the P o p e .  Other special chsracteristiss 
of the Vatican served i t  w e l l .  Confidentizlity is something the 
Church always valu9d very highly an3 hss much practica in 
maintaining. T h e  mediators used the very credible acsuran,:e of 
confidentiality to pr3mote e a ~ n t u a l l y  3. broader exploratjon z>f 
interests and possible options thcn might have been pcssible in e 
more leaky mediation. T h s  Vatican aIso ha3 direct channels t o  
the negotiators' leaders ithrough the Vatican's dipIomatic 
representation in both countries) and electorat5s I t h r ~ u g h  the 
lccel churches). T h e  latter access became important, fcr- 
example, when the final treaty needed ratificatijn in Argentina 
in a pubIic referendum 
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T H E  ANTARCTIC MINERALS NEGOTIATIONS A S  A N  EXAMPLE O F  A SINGLE 
NEGOTIATING TEXT ENTI. ( . r  ~ 0 4 1 )  
* 
The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties iATCP's) began 
negotiating a n  Antarctic minerals regime in 1952. The ATCP 5 
include Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, C h i l e ,  Federal 
Republic of Germany, France, German Democratic Republic, India, 
Italy, Japan, N e w  Zealand, Norway, the People's Republic of 
China, Poland, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the united 
Kingdom, the United S t a t e s ,  and Uruguay (Kimball, 1988). T h e  
negotiations were characterized by significant informal 
diplomacy, a n  emphasis o n  consensus building w i t h i n  ad hoc 
working groups, and at least three successive informal but 
significant texts prepared by Chairman Christopher D. Beeby of 
N e w  Zealand -- the first in 1983, the second in 1 3 8 4 ,  and the 
third in 1986. These "Beeby texts" can be taken as a n  example of 
a single negotiating text. Each represented Beeby's perception, 
considering all issues together as a package, of the extent of 
consensus that appeared to exist at the time. T h e  r e v i s j ~ n s  
represented by the second and third texts were comprehensive 
rather than piecemeal. In each case they reflected B e ~ b y ' s  
consideration of extensive discuasjons, fcrmal and informal, 
generated by the previsus versicn. 
T h e  Convention o n  the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Rescurce 
kztivities !CRAMRA) w a s  signed o n  June 2 ,  1388 and is expected t o  
be formally adopted in Wellington, N e w  Zealand o n  November 1 1 ,  
1988. T o  enter into force i t  will require ratificaticn by 16 3f 
the 20 A T C P 1 s .  Joyner i19871 attributes much of the 
negotiation's success, at least through May 1 5 8 7 ,  to its 
productive procedural choices, among which the Beeby texts were 
particularly sjgnificant. 
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THE PARTIAL EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT IN SEPTEMBER 1 9 7 5  AS 
AN EXAMPLE OF AN INCREMENTAL AGREEMENT. ( r  E042) 
1: 
Stein ( 1 9 8 5 )  writes of the September 1 9 7 5  agreement. "[Henry1 
Kissinger favored transitional agreements that would permit 
change in preference structures over time. He hoped t h ~ t  as a 
result of working with arrangements in place, the p a r t j ~ s  W O U I , ~  
acquire new confidence in each other. In addition, the 
transitional arrangements would reduce the risk of concessisns. 
since these arrangements were not irrevocable or final. For 
example, in the [September 1 9 7 5 1  agreement beth:een Egypt and 
Israel! Kissinger put in place B series of arrangements to 
monitor the ebservance of the limited fcrce zcnes that were t 3  
last three years, until September 1 9 7 6 .  He hoped that, bs the 
end of this period, the opportunity costs ~f retreat from 
agreement would have become too large for both Egypt and Israel, 
that the pro:ess in place would have changed at least some sf the 
basic preferences on each side . . "  
"As Kissinger had predicted, the alternative to concession - -  ?. 
return to the use of force - -  waz far less attrective to both 
partjes in 1 9 7 8  than i t  had been in 1 9 7 4 .  In the changed 
negotiating environment, a bilateral agenda that was 
comprehensive rather than limited in scope was conceivabls t; 
both sides." 
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T H E  C A M P  D A V I D  N E G O T I A T I O N S  B E T W E E N  E G Y P T  A N D  ISRAEL A 5  A N  
E X A M P L E  O F  SEPARATING I S S U E S .  i #  E 0 4 3 )  
* 
T h e  1976 C a m p  David negotiations involving E g y p t ,  I s r a e l ,  and the 
United S t a t e s  provide a n  example of separating particularlv 
problematic issues off the agenda so that they do not prevent 
implementable agreement on less problematic issues. "tPresident1 
C a r t e r ,  like [Henry] K i s s i n g e r ,  postponed the most intractable 
i s s u e s ;  effectively he took them off the bargaining a g e n d a .  
D i s c u s s i o n  o f  J e r u s a l e m ,  for e x a m p l e ,  w a s  relagted to a n  exchange 
of letters in w h i c h  all three leaders expressed their positions, 
agreeing to d i s a g r e e .  T h e  d i f f i c u l t  negotiations o n  the form and 
substance of P a l e s t i n i a n  autoncmy w e r e  postponed until after the 
peace treaty between Egypt and Israel w a s  concluded. A n d  
determination of the final s t a t u s  of the West Bank and the Gaza 
S t r i p  w a s  not scheduled until after Israel completed its 
withdrawal from the S i n a i . "  ( S t e i n ,  1 9 8 5 )  
R e f e r e n c e s :  
Janice G r o s s  S t e i n ;  " S t r u c t u r e s ,  S t r a t e g i e s ,  and T a c t i c s  of 
M e d i a t i o n :  Kissinger a n d  Carter in the M i d d l e  E a s t , "  Ncgctiati:n 
J o u r n a l ,  V o l .  1 ,  N o .  4 ,  PP 331-347. October 1965 
L A S T  M O D I F I E D :  McEonald - 3 / 2 9 / 8 8  - unchecked 
* K  
# E043 / E X A M P L E S  / C O O P E R A T I V E  TAC,TICS i 
SEPARATING I S S U E S  i U N I T E E  S T A T E S  ! USA ! ISRAEL ! E G Y P T  ! 
T E R R I T O R Y  / P A L E S T I N I A N S  / 
INTERNATIONAL / D R Y  
* c 
T H E  COLUMBIA RIVER T R E A T Y  A 5  AN E X A M P L E  OF J O I N T  A N A L Y S I S  
I #  E044j 
* 
T h e  process that eventually resulted in the 1961 C o l u m b i a  R i v e r  
T r e a t y  between Canada and the United S t a t e s  began in 1 9 4 4  w i t h  a n  
example of joint a n a l y s i s .  I n  that year "the governments of 
Canada and the U n i t e d  S t a t e s  . . .  referred the task of assessing the 
possibilities for co-operative development of the Columbia R i v e r  
to the International Joint C o m m i s s i o n  (IJC)," w h i c h  had been set 
up under the 1 9 0 9  C a n a d a - U . S .  Boundary W a t e r s  T r e a t y .  T h e  1JC 
then established the International Columbia R i v e r  Engineering 
Board (ICREB), w i t h  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  from both countries, to 
undertake the necessary engineering studies of potential projects 
and alternative basin-wide s y s t e m s  incorporating the different 
p r o j e c t s .  T h e  ICREB submitted its report in 1 9 5 9 .  On the basis 
of the report negotiations then b e g a n ,  first o n  principles to 
guide the selection of projects and the allocation of costs and 
benefits (see Entries # E045 3nd # E0461, an3 then on the 
specifics of a formal treaty. In contrast to the 15 years 
required for the ICREB analysis, the negotiation ?n principles 
took eleven months, and the negotiation of the 1961 Treaty itself 
took another eleven months. However, negotiation of a 
supplemental agreement was also required before Canada formally 
ratified the Treaty in 1964. 
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THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY AS AN EXAI4PLE O F  INCREMENTAL 
AGREEMENTS ( W  E045i 
* 
The process leading to the 1961 Cclumbiz River Trestv began with 
a joint analysis, described in Entry # E014, t , ~  the Internatianal 
Columbia River Engineering Board (ICREB). On the b a ~ i s  of that 
analysis the Internatic#nal Joint C o m m i ~ s i c n  !IJC), which had been 
set up under the 1909 Canada-U 5. Boundary Waters Treaty, then 
negotjated an initial "incremental agreement" on principles to 
guide preparation of the Treaty itself. The objectives 
incorporated in these principles were to assure the most econcmic 
overall system possible, to assure a division of costs and 
benefits that was regarded as fair and made the ~ o i n t  system 
Preferable to both countries over alternatives they could develop 
unilaterally, and t o  accomodate political or other interests of 
the parties that would not be captured by solely economic and 
engineering calculations. 
This initial, incremental agreement on mutual objectives, and 
their explicit wording, was considered an important step in 
eventually completing the Columbia River Treaty. Entry 4 l  E046 
summarizes some of the specifics of the IJC principles. 
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THE COLUMBIA RIVER TREATY AS AN EXAMPLE OF 1) EQUALLY DIVIDING 
DOWNSTREAM BENEFIT5 DUE TO UPSTREAM STORAGE, AND 2 )  DIVIDING 
OTHER BENEFITS, A5 WELL AS COSTS, "IN PROPORTION TO" THE LOCATIGN 
OF THE FACILITIES. ( O  E046i 
* 
A5 described in Entry r E045, negotiation of the 1961 Columbia 
River Treaty between Ccnaja anj the Unjted States was prezedtd by 
agreement on a set a principles to guide the negotiation. Among 
other things, these principles addressed the allocation of ccsts 
and benefits. 
Power Principle No. 6 provides that, "The power benefit C t . 0 1  the 
downstream cauntry from regulation of fl3w in the upstream 
country should be shared on a basis such that the benefit, in 
power, to each 'ountry will be substantially equal, prcvijed that 
such sharing would result in an advantage to each country as 
compared with alternatives available to that c o u n t r y . . .  Each 
country should assume responsibility for providing that part of 
the facilities needed for the cooperative development that is 
located within its own territory." (Department of External 
Affairs, and Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1964. 
quoted in Krutilla, 1967) 
Flood Control Principle No. 4 reads that, "The upstream country 
should be paid one-half of the benefits as measured in Flood 
Control Principle No. 3 ,  i . e . ,  one-half of the value of the 
[flood3 damages prevented." (Department of External Affairs, and 
Northern Affairs and National Resources, 1964, quoted in 
Krutilla, 1967) 
Thus the principles divide costs based on (or "proportional to") 
location, they share equally any downstream flood control and 
power benefits from upstream storage, and they otherwise allocate 
benefits proportional to location. That is, they allocate to the 
upstream country any upstream benefits from upstream facilities, 
and to the downstream country any downstream benefits from 
downstream facilities. It should be noted that Krutilla (1967) 
emphasizes that i f  the overall system is in fact made up of the 
most economic possible collection of projects, these principles 
for dividing costs and benefits will not necessarily result in 
both parties finding partizipation in the joint system better 
than their unilateral alternatives. Thus the inclusion in Power 
Principle No. 6 of the qualifier, "Where such sharing should not 
result in an advantage to each country ..there should be 
negotiated and agreed upon such other division of benefits or 
other adjustments as would be equitable to both countries, and 
would make the cooperative development feasible." (fiepartment of 
External Affairs, and Northern Affairs and National Resources, 
1964, quoted in Krutilla, 1967) As i t  turned out, the final 
terms of the 1961 Columbia River Treaty take advantage of this 
qualifier in several instances. 
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THE 1958-1961 ICELANDIC FISHERIES DISPUTE AS AN EXAMPLE OF 
SEPARATING ISSUES AND SUBSEQUENT TRADEOFFS. ( r  ~ 0 9 7 )  
4 
In 1958 lceland precipitated a dispute with the United Kingdom by 
announcing that Iceland would extend its territorial limits from 
four to twelve miles offshore. The ocean newly enclosed by the 
twelve-mile boundary would be closed to UK fishing. UK fishermen 
ignored the lcelandic position which led to several incidents 
involving the Icelandic Coast Guard, UK trawlers, a UK destroyer 
at one point, and gunfire at another. 
"Tension eased, however, when Iceland announced that i t  planned 
to raise the matter of territorial limjts a t  the UN Law of the 
Sea Conference scheduled for 1960. 
"The Conference met from March to April but failed to officially 
extend off-shore fishing limlts The UK then suggested bilateral 
talks be held and agreed to halt fishing activity in the dispute3 
waters while negotiations were in progress Agreement wzs 
reached in 1961: the UK dropped its objections to the 12-mile 
limit, and Iceland agreed to allow British vessels to operete in 
the area during specified months of the year. Icelandic policy 
led tc a renewed dispute on these issues ten years later." 
(Butterworth, 1976) 
The 1961 agreement thus separated the issue of sovereignty from 
that of fishing rights, allowing a trade where Iceland was 
satisfied on the sovereignty issue and the UK got fishing rights 
that i t  considered acceptable. 
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THE 1973 DE LA PLATA RIVER AGREEMENT BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND 
URUGUAY AS AN EXAMPLE OF SEPARATING ISZUES, OF TRADLOFFS, AbJD OF 
JOINT OWNERSHIP. i l  E048) 
* 
"The Cde la Plata River1 is formed by the confluence of the 
Uruguay and Parana Rivers, at which point i t  is 25 miles wide; i t  
flows 150 miles to debouche into the Atlantic, at which point i t  
is 125 miles wide. The river is generally quite shallow and is 
subject to shifting obstructions formed by silt; its deepest 
channel runs quite close to Uruguay for almost its entire 
length . . .  Jurisdiction over the river was never precisely 
demarcated; before 1969 both Argentina and Uruguay shared its use 
freely under the terms of a 1910 protocol. Several decades 
before 1969 Argentina had occupied Martin Garcia Island and 
during the 1960s maintained a naval station on i t ;  Uruguay had 
never acquiesced in this arrangement but i t  created no conflict. 
"During 13te 1968, however, Uruguay callej for bids by 
international corporations to develop 0 1 1  and natural gas field= 
on the continental shelf underlying the Flata estuary. Argentina 
protested, laying claim to portions of the territcry that Uruguay 
had planned to exploit. Jurisdicti~nal disputes ovcr v3ri,2us 
islands were revived. . Argentina forces occupied . . .  Timcteo 
Dominguez . . .  Uruguay insisted that the river should be 
demarcated at its geographic center, such a border would leave i t  
controlling the malor channel. Argentina insisted that the 
boundary should follow the deep channel, a division leaving i t  
controlling virtually all of the oil resources under the river." 
(Butterworth, 1976) 
The resolution came only in 1973. "After suitable arrangements 
had been made for joint economic exploitation of the oil 
resources, the Uruguayan position had been adopted. The middle 
of the river was taken as the boundary, but the accord provided 
for international use of the various channels in the river. In 
addition, Argentina was awarded Martin Garcia and i t  agreed to 
convert the island from a navy station ta a resort spot. Uruguay 
gained possession of the Timoteo fiominguez k e y . "  (Eutterw3rth, 
1976) 
Thus the agreement sepzrated the issues cf sovereignty (and 
territory!, navigation rights, economic rights to oil r e s o u r c ? ~ .  
and even land use tin the caze of Martin Garcia Island) to allow 
tradeoffs that made oa,:h country better ~ f f  than with the status 
quo. The reference does not provide deteils about the "suitable 
arrangements" for j ~ i n t  explojtetisn of oil resources. Th9 
keyword " ~ o i n t  ownershjp" has been included to refer tc these 
arrangements. Even th.>ugh they msy nzt meet legal criteria f.zr 
joint ownership, that a p ~ e a r s  to be their effect. Thus the use 
of the keyword "joint ownership" in the absence of sufficient 
knowledge to permit a better phrase. 
Robert Lyle Futterworth twith Margaret E. Scranton), "Managing 
Interstate Conflict, 1945-74: fiata with Synopses," University 
Center for Internctional Studies. University of Pittsburgh, 1976. 
p .  430-331 
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T H E  ZAMBEZI A C T I O N  P L A N  ( Z A C P L A N )  A S  A N  EXAMPLE OF A N  INCREMENTAL 
A G R E E M E N T ,  A N  INTERVENOR W I T H  R E S O U R C E S  A N D  I N T E R E S T S ,  A N D  A 
M I X T U R E  OF J O I N T  A N A L Y S I S  A N D  THIRD-PARTY A N A L Y S I S .  ( t  E 0 4 9 )  
* 
In the development of the 198? Zambezi Action P l a n  ( Z A C P L A N ) ,  i t  
w a s  the United Nations Environment Programme ( U N E P )  that w a s  the 
intervenor w i t h  r e s o u r c e s  and interests. In 1 9 8 5 ,  in response to 
interest expressed by the H e a d s  of S t a t e  of B o t s w a n a ,  Z a m b i a ,  and 
Zimbabwe for h e l p  in the devlopment of regional cooperation and 
in the promotion of s u s t a i n a b l e  development, U N E P  helped 
establish a W o r k i n g  G r o u p  of Experts o n  the Zambezi R i v e r  S y s t e m .  
T h e  W o r k i n g  G r o u p  involved representatives from B o t s w a n a ,  M a l a w i ,  
M o z a m b i q u e ,  T a n z a n i a ,  Z a m b i a ,  Z i m b a b w e ,  the United Nations 
Council for N a m i b i a ,  and a number of international o r g a n i z a t i o n s .  
A n g o l a  w a s  invited to be represented but did not p a r t i c i p a t e .  
T h e  W o r k i n g  G r o u p  e f f o r t s  can be characterized as a m i x t u r e  of 
joint analysis and third-party a n a l y s i s .  T h e  Working G r o u p  met 
three times f r o m  1985-1987, m a d e  substantial use of outside 
consultants in its w o r k ,  and prepared two d o c u m e n t s :  a 
"Diagnostic S t u d y  on the Present State of the Ecology and the 
Environmental Management of the Common Zambezi River S y s t e m "  
( U N E P ,  1987a) and a draft Zambezi A c t i o n  P l a n .  
In May 1987 Z A C P L A N  w a s  formally signed by B c t s w a n a ,  M c z a m b i q u e ,  
T a n z a n i a ,  Z a m b i a ,  and Z i m b a b w e .  It is best described a5 a n  
incremental agreement because i t  limits itself to expressed 
agreement o n  broad goals and the importance of particular 
problems w i t h i n  the Zambezi basin. It proposes 19 projects 
concerned m a i n l y  w i t h  c3llecting and disseminating information, 
conducting r e s e a r c h ,  developing integrated plans and procedures. 
and preparing for a r e g i ~ n a l  legal convention and supporting 
national l e g i s l a t i o n .  It proposes a budget including 
contributions from U N E P ,  other international organizations, and 
the basin c o u n t r i e s ,  both the five that signed Z A C P L A N  and the 
three that did n o t .  It proposes that Z A C P L A N  be implemented by 
the S o u t h e r n  A f r i c a n  Development Coordination Conference ( S A D C Z ) ,  
a n j  S A D C C  took o n  that respc~nsibility formally later in l Q B ? .  
R e f e r e n c e s  
United N a t i o n s  Environment Programme ( 1 9 8 7 a 1 ,  "Diagnostic S t u d y  
o n  the Present S t a t e  of the Ecology and the Environmental 
Management of the C o m m o n  Zambezi R i v e r  S y s t e m , "  E M I N W A  P r o g r a m m e ,  
prepared f o r  the Conference of Plenipotentiaries o n  the 
Environmental Management of the C o m m o n  Zambezi R i v e r  S y s t e m ,  
H a r a r e ,  M a y  1987, U N E P ,  U N E P I I G . 7 8  B a c k g r o u n d ,  paper 1 ,  1 0  M a r c h  
1 9 8 7  
United N a t i o n s  Environment Programme ( 1 9 8 7 b 1 ,  "Agreement o n  n the 
A c t i o n  P l a n  for the environment all^ Sound Management of the 
C o m m o n  Z a m b e z i  R i v e r  S y s t e m  - Final A c t ,  H a r a r e ,  26-28 M a y  1 9 8 7  
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THE 1984 SKAGIT RIVER VALLEY TREATY AS AN EXAMPLE OF SEPARATING 
ISSUES, THUS ALLOWING MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL TRADEOFFS. ( *  E050) 
* 
In 1942 the Canada-United States International Joint Commission 
(1JC.i approved a proposal t~ raise the height of ths R555 fiam in 
the State of Washington, thus flooding the Skagit River Valley, 
to supply electricity to Seattle, u.!a~.hingt2n "The IJtC ? r 3 ~ r  
prescribed that the dam would be raised in stages in accordance 
with future power requirements . . .  In 1353 the Ross Dzm w a s  
raised to its present level which flooded 2 limited area. . . .  In 
1967 Seattle and British Columbia reached an agreement ;;hj.:h 
authorized raising the dam to its highest level which wruld have 
resulted in the flooding of 1902 h~ctares of Ian3 in the province 
Ross Dam agreement and the flocding that would result " CAlper 
and Monehan, 1986J The resolution only came in 1 3 5 4 .  It 
involved separating the issue of electricity generation from dsm 
construction. 
"The Settlement, which will be in force for a period of eighty 
(80) years, ensures that the flooding of the Skasit Valley into 
British Columbia will not take place. Seattle will not raise the 
Ross Dam and, in return, British Columbia will supply the zity 
with electicity equivalent to that which would have been 
generated had the dam been raised. British Columbia will recejve 
as payment for the electricity the sums equivalent to the cost o i  
construction, operation and maintenance of the dam." [Canadian 
Department of External Affairs, 19841 
Formally, the settlement involved three separate agreements: l j  a 
British Columbia-Seattle Agreement signed on March 30, 1 9 8 4 ;  2) 
the "Treaty between Canada and the United States of America 
Relating to the Skagit River and Ross Lake, and the Seven Mile 
Reservoir on the Pend d'oreille River" (the Skagit River Valley 
Treaty) signed on April 2 ,  1984; and 3) a Canada-British Columbia 
Agreement signed on October 29, 1984. 
References: 
"Skagit River Valley Treaty: Canada-British Columbia Agreement," 
Communique No. 151, Canadian Departmsnt of External Affairs. 
October 29, 1984 
Donald K .  Alper and Robert L .  Monahan, "Regional Transbounjarv 
Negotiations Leading to the Skagit River Treaty: Analysis and 
Future Application," Canadian Public Policy, XII:1:163-174, 1 3 5 6  
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"VOLUNTARY RESTRAINT" OF MINERAL RESOURCE ACTIVITIES A S  AN 
EXAMPLE OF A CONTINGENT AGREEMENT AMONG T H E  ANTARCTIC TREATY 
CONSULTATIVE PARTIES (ATCP'S). i #  E051) 
L 
In 1986 the ATCP's concluded the Conventicn on the Regulation of 
Antarctic Mineral Resources Activities (LRAMRAj. Prior to the 
treaty they had followed a policy of voluntary restraint 
articulated in Recommendation IX-1 of the ninth Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting (ACTM) held in London in 1977. 
"[The ATCP'sI urge their nationals and other States to 
refrain from all exploration and exploitation of Antarctic 
mineral resources while making progress towards the timely 
adoption of an agreed regime concerning Antarctic mineral 
resource activities. They will thus endeavour to assure 
that, pending the timely adoption of agreed solutions 
pertaining to exploration and exploitation of mineral 
resources, no activity shall be conducted to explore or 
exploit such resources " 
This can be seen as 2 contingent agreement accomodating both 
those worrisd that the absen:e of an a g r ~ e j  regjme vculd lead to 
destructive exploitation, and those worried that the commitment 
to gait for an agreed regime could be explojted by a party 
wanting tc block development. T h ~ t  is, i f  things were to mcve 
along expeditiously, as presumedly intended by those wnrrjed 
about destructive exploitation, such exploitation would be 
successfu1ly avoided. And i f  the negotiations were intenti~nally 
impeded, states wanting to pursue development would be free tc n c  
longer voluntarilv restrain min;ral activitjes. 
As i t  turned out, the negotiations moved along expeditiously 
CRAMRA was signed on June 2 ,  19Bd. (See also entry # E 0 4 1 . )  
References : 
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THE 1984 SKAGIT RIVER VALLEY TREATY NEGOTIATIONS AS AN EXAMPLE OF 
THIRIb-PARTY ANALYSIS. ( #  E0521 
a 
In 1942 the Canada-United States International Joint Commission 
(IJC) approved a proposal to raise the height of the Ross Dam in 
the State of Washington, thus flooding the Skagit River Valley, 
to supply electricity to Seattle, Washington. "The IJC order 
prescribed that the dam would be raised in stages in accordance 
with future power requirements." CAlper and Monahan, 19863 A s  
described in Entry r E050, the Ross Dam was raised once in 1953, 
but a 1967 agreement between Seattle and British Columbia to 
raise the dam further ran into trouble in the 1970s. The 
eventual resolution formalized in the 1984 treaty is summarized 
in Entry # E050. In the negotiations leading up to the treetv 
the constructjve role of third-party analysis under the auspices 
of the IJC is described as follows by Alper and Monahan il966i 
"A . . .  factor important in the IJC role was its recognitian of 
the impasse caused by each side having their own technical 
(working) committees to advise the principal negotjators. These 
committees became fixed in their narrow perspectives and, as 
would be expected, each side accused the other of inflexibili!~ 
and bias. T o  overcome this problem the IJC constituted its cwn 
binational technical committee consisting of Douglas Gordon, 
Chief Executive Officer of Ontario Hydro, and George Ferry, 
former director of the Power Authority of the State of Mew Y3rk 
(PASNY). The two-man committee was a c c e ~ t e d  by the technical 
people as well as the lead negotiators on both sides bezause they 
were acknowledged leaders in the power field, had worked across 
the border over a long period of time, understood the IJC an3 its 
activities and, as easterners, were not identified with British 
Columbia or Seattle . . .  Ths existence of this impartial and 
autonomous source of information proved to be a major factor in 
moving the negotiations forward." 
References: 
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THE 1984 SKAGlT RIVER VALLEY TREATY NEGOTIATIONE A 5  A N  EXAMPLE OF 
A N  INTERVENOR WITH RESOURCES AND INTERESTS. ! %  E053j 
* 
In 1942 the Canada-United States International Joint Commission 
(IJC) approved a proposal to raise the height of the Ross Dam in 
the State of Washington, thus flooding the Skagit River Valley, 
to supply electricity to Seattle, Washington. "The IJC order 
prescribed that the dam would be raised in stages in accordance 
with future power requirements." CAlper and Monshan, 19863 A s  
described in Entry # E050, the Ross Dam was raised once in 1953, 
but a 1967 agreement between Seattle and British Columbia to 
raise the dam further ran into trouble in the 1970s. "The new 
opposition to the flooding and asked the IJC to void its 1942 
order which also would have had the effect of invalidating the 
1967 . . .  agreement. In 1972 the pro:?ince formally repudiated the 
1967 agreement." [Alper and Monahan, 19861 The eventucl 
resolution formalized in the 1384 treaty is s u m m a r i z ~ d  in Entry # 
E050. In the negotiations leading up to the treaty the IJC had 
an Important role as a thjrd-party, or intervsnzr, with interests 
and resources. The IJZ's interest was in a timely r e s o l u t i ~ n  of 
th? dispute that wis advantageous to bath parties; that is the 
IJC's raison d'etre. Entry % E 0 5 2  describes how the IJZ used its 
technical resources to provide fsr constructive third-p3rty 
analysis. Another resource of the IJC was its power,' i f  the 
parties could not agree, t a  impose a r ~ ~ \ I u t j , n  b y  ruling one k:ay 
or the other on Eri ti5.h Columtiais formal request to void the 
1942 order. Alper and Monahan ( 1 3 6 6 )  describe one wav in which 
that resource w a ~ .  used. 
"The IJZ was able to induce a sense of crisis for the negotiztors 
by setting a one-year deadline !later extended to a seconJ vesr) 
by which time the t w ~  parties wculd have to reach c settlement 
The commissioners were able to pressure the two pjrtjes to 
negotiate seriously by convincing each, in separate discursions, 
that i t  might well lose i f  the IJC were to rule on the 1342 
order. BY taking advantage of this uncertainty they convinced 
British Columbia that the IJC would probably rule on the strict 
legal grounds that favoured Seattle and, at the same time, 
convinced Seattle the IJC would probably rule on the broader 
environmental considerations that favoured British Columbia. Fy 
taking a tough line and making different and contradictory 
arguments to each side CComrnissioners E. Richmond1 Olson and 
[Keith] Bulen accomplished the difficult task of making 
negotiation and compromise the preferred option for both parties. 
Thus, the IJC was crucial to the starting and continuation of 
serious negotiations" 
References: 
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T H E  1986 LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT TREATY AS AN EXAMPLE OF 
TRADING OFF THE ISSUES OF WATER SUPPLY AND HYDROELECRICIT-f, ANE 
OF COST ALLOCATION PRgPORTIONAL T O  T H E  FUNCTION OF FACILITIES 
(I EG54i 
* 
"In October 1960 the Kingdom of Lesctho and the Republic cf South 
Africa CRSAJ signed a Treaty on the proposed Lesothc H 1 3 h l a n j s  
Water Project CLHWPJ This US S 4 0 0 0  M mu1 ti-purpose project, t o  
be bujlt in phases, serves to double the water resources 
available to the largest c o n c e n t r a t ~ o n  of economlc activjty in 
South Africa centered in Johannesburg and to provide a 13rge 
measure of self-sufficiency in electric power tc Lescthz " [Sole 
and Van Robbroeck, 17683 The central trade in the p r o ~ e c t  1 5  
that 
1) South Africa, which badly needs water, gets water from 
Lesetho, where "few opportunities exist for using it5 water 
resources for irrigztion," [Sole and Vcn Robbroeck, 19863, while 
2 )  Lesotho, which has substantial external debt relative to 
potential earnings, gets royalties for the water plus a 
hydroelectric facility which i t  could not finance as a sep3rate 
project on its own and which will make i t  much less dependent on 
electricity imports from South Africa. 
Because South Africa is interested in water supplies and Lesotho 
is interested in hydroelectricity, the basic cost allocation 
principal was to allocate costs of various project components in 
proportion to their function. Thus the costs associated with 
supplying South Africa with water are to be charged to South 
Africa, and the costs of the hydroelectric facility are to be 
charged to Lesotho. However, many components serve both 
functions. "Consequently i t  was decided [to allocate costs3 to 
the RSA based on the cost of a theoretical 'water-only' scheme, 
designed to the same standards as the multi-purpose scheme. The 
difference between the cost of the multi-purpose scheme and the 
water-only one would be regarded a s  the cost of the hydro-scheme 
That means that the marginal cost would be allocated to hydro- 
generation, which obviously improves the economic viability of 
such scheme markedly." [Sole and Van Robbroeck, 19b81 
References: 
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THE 1986 LESOTHO HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT TREATY A5 AN EXAMPLE Of 
TRADING OFF THE IS5VES OF SOVEREIGNTY AND OPERATIONAL CONTROL 
( #  E0551 
* 
"In October 1986 the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Republic of South 
Africa CRSA3 signed a Treaty on the proposed Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project tLHWP3. This US S 4 0 0 0  M multi-purpose project, to 
be built in phases, serves to double the water resources 
available to the largest concentration of economic activity in 
South Africa centered in Johannesburg and to provide a large 
measure of self-sufficiency in electric power to Lesctho." [Sole 
and Van Robbroeck, 19883 
One problematic issue in the negotiations was establishing 
institutions to manage the project that would be acceptable to 
both sides. South Africa will pay about 90% of the cost of the 
project, which will double the water supply to South Africa's 
industrial heartland [Sole and Van Robbroeck, 19883. It has a 
strong interest in institutions i t  ludges sufficient to allow i t  
to protect its investment and its water s u p p l y .  Most cf the 
mammoth project will be built and operated in L e s o t h o ,  h o w e v e r ,  
and Lesotho w a s  concerned that institutional arrangements n3t 
encroach on Lesotho's sovereignty. 
"Initially, a bi-national private company with equal share- 
holding by the twc Governments w a s  contemplated. T h i s  idea w a s  
taken as far as the drafting of a complete set of Articles of 
Association. I n  the e n d ,  this formula w a s  found to be 
insufficient to overcome the issue of sovereignty . . .  [The 
eventual solution w a s  that in1 e € c h  country, a n  autonomous 
statutory body under the respective country's own laws w a s  
created and entrusted w i t h  the implementation of that part of the 
p r o ~ e c t  situated on its own soil: the Lesotho Highlands 
Development Authority (LHDA) in Lesotho and the T r a n s  Caledon 
Tunnel Authority (TCTA) in the RSA . . . I n  order to meet the 
legitimate concerns of the two parties o n  what is happening 
across the border, a Joint Permanent Technical Commission (JPTC) 
w a s  created by the T r e a t y .  T h i s  is a bi-national organization 
with equal representation by the two countries T h e  Treaty gives 
monitoring and advisory power to the J P T C ,  and also powers of 
approval of key actions of t h ~  two parastatals, as enumerated in 
Article 9 . .  Decisions have to be taken by consensus T h e  lack 
of agreement by one Party therefarc amounts to a veto " CSole a n d  
Van Robbroeck. 1 9 8 8 1  
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THE CALCULATION O F  WATER DELIVERY ROYALTIES I N  THE 1 9 8 6  LESOTHO 
HIGHLANDS WATER PROJECT TREATY A5 AN EXAMPLE OF A CONTINGENT 
AGREEMENT. ( #  E056) 
* 
"In October 1986 the Kingdom of Lesotho and the Republic of south 
Africa CRSAJ signed a Treaty on the proposed Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project CLHWPJ. This US $ 4000 M multi-purpose project, to 
be built in phases. serves to double the water resources 
available to the largest concentration of economic activity in 
South Africa centered in Johannesburg and to provide a large 
measure of self-sufficiency in electric power to Lesotho." [Sole 
and Van Robbroeck, 19887 
The parties agreed to split the benefits of the project with 56% 
going to Lesotho and 44% to South Africa. They also agreed on 
how to define benefits: the difference between the cost of the 
LHWP and the least-cost alternative available to South Africa to 
supply the same amount of water on its own. However. "the lack 
of sufficient reliable hydrological data made i t  impossjble for 
the countries to agree on the annual yield of the two projects, 
and consequently the precise sizes of the components an4 their 
costs." [Sole and Van Robbroeck, 19883 The solution was a 
contingent agreement. They agreed what data needed to b~ 
collected, they agreed who would collect the data, they agreed 
how to resolve disputes about the data, and they agreed on 
precisely how the benefit of the Prcject would be calculated once 
the a p p r ~ v e d  data were in hand. Thus the royalties t~ b e  p a i d  b y  
South Africa to Lesotho for LHWP water deliveries were made 
contingent, acc.ording to a precisely spelled out prozejure. on 
future hydrological data. 
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M E Scle and T P C Van Robbroeck, "A Unique Treaty for t h e  
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Congress, Ottawa Canada, May 29 - June 3 ,  1966 
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DEFINITIONS: FAIR DIVISION 
Most negotiations have a possible cooperative dimension, i . e . ,  
the possibility of "making the pie biggsr." However, all 
negotiations have a competitive dimension, i . e . ,  how to divide 
the "pie" up. Sometimes i t  is easier to agree a priori ta a rule 
or Procedure for dividing benefits, or allocating costs, than i t  
is to negotiate competitively a specific division. Examples of 
possible rules or procedures that negotiators might use are 
keyworded in this database with the phrase FAIR DIVISION. Therc 
is no one set of feir division rules or procedures that is 
theoretically or practically perfect There are instead a number 
of options. Options included in this data base have the 
following keywords. 
DIVIDE-AND-CHOOSE 
EQUAL BENEFITS 
EQUAL BURDENS 
EQUAL COSTS 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 
NUCLEOLUS 
PROPORTIONAL BENEFIT5 
PRGPORTIONAL BURDENS 
PROPORTIONAL COSTS 
PROPDRTI O N k L  NUCLEOLUS 
SEPARABLE COSTS - REMAINING BENEFITS or SCRF 
3H.z.PLEY VALUE 
STEINHAUS PROCEDURE 
WEAK NUCLEOLUS 
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DEFINITIONS: RISK AVERSION 
Most people are not gamblers. They are risk avers~e. That is, 
they would prefer $ 5 0  for certain to a promise of 6 1 0 0  i f  a coin 
f l i p  comes up heads (and nothing i f  i t  comes up tails). It is 
because people are risk averse that insurance arrangements are 
desirable. An individual prefers paying a definite modest sum 
(his premium) to taking the gamble of either paying nothing, i f  
he meets with no accident, or paying quite a bit in the event oi 
an accident, unlikely though that accident may be. Because 
people are risk averse, the total they collectivel~ pay in 
premiums to the insurance company more than covers the claims. 
Thus parties to a negotiation can sometimes share risks to their 
mutual advantage through devising appropriate insurance 
arrangements. 
If they are risk averse to different degrees, there are 
additional options they should explore. For example, even if txo 
people agree totally on the probability that a given stock c.pticrn 
will be a bonanza, and the probability i t  will be a disaster, if 
one is more risk averse than the ather, they should be able tc 
find a price at which the more risk averse investor will sell his 
options to the less risk averse investor, and both will walk away 
happy with the deal. 
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DEFINITIONS: CONTINGENT AGREEMENTS 
Where two parties disagree in their expectations about the 
future, that difference can sometimes be exploited by a 
contingent agreement. In a river basin negotiation imagine a 
downstream party unhappy wjth a pollution control technology 
propose3 by a potentia.1 polluter upstream. The downstream party 
has less confidence that the technology will work as advertised 
than does the potentisl polluter. That i s ,  they have different 
expectations. H o w e v e r ,  they bcth might agree to a n  arrangement 
where the potential polluter commits to immediately shutting d?wn 
his operation if monitors s h o w  pollution climbing ebovr an agreed 
trigger value. T h e  potential polluter sees such a n  agrs?ment as 
relatively costless because he thinks i t  very unlikely the 
trigger value will ever 'e exceeded. T h e  dswnstrearn pa.rty, 
however, thinks i t  more likely that the trigger will be exceeded, 
and thus the commitment to shut the plant down is very ualuat~le 
to him. 
There are at least two important ch8racteristics of successful 
contingent agreements. F i r s t ,  as time ~ 3 5 5 e s  one party s 
expectations will be proven r i g h t ,  and the provisions of the 
contingent agreement favoring that party will be t r i d g e r ~ d .  If 
these ere perceived, after the fect, as unfairly onerous by the 
other party, he may have strong incentives to rene-ge, and the 
agreement m a y  not be sustainable. T h u s  the future susteinability 
of the agreement, no matter w h o  turns out to be right, must be 
considered. Second, i t  is important that whatever is to indicate 
whose expectations turn out to be right be something relatively 
unambiguous and unmanipulsble. I n  the hypothetical example 
above, i t  m a y  be desirable to make a neutral third party 
responsible for monitoring whether pollution levels exceed the 
trigger value, o r  to meke the agreement very specific about the 
monitoring equipment and procedures. 
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